Rethinking Pakistan as a Democracy

Pakistan’s experience as a democratic nation has been marked by complex challenges and transformative events. Although apparently, the country’s administrative structure continues to be based on democratic values, its history has been plagued by instances of military dictatorship and political instability. This article delves into the nuances of rethinking Pakistan’s democratic trajectory, examining the challenges it faces and the potential avenues for strengthening its democratic institutions. Between the democratic rhetoric and the actual political landscape of Pakistan lies a significant gap that the country has failed to overcome over the past years. The socio-politico circles which have stakes in politics do support democracy in theory. They recognize that a desirable political system must have the following qualities: the rule of law, socioeconomic justice, ruler accountability, and, most importantly, free and fair elections. Similarly, they adhere to these ideas in their manifestos and speeches, however, their daily politics do not always adhere to these ideals. These concepts are frequently refuted by political realities. Most civilian and military leaders aim to personalize power and govern politics in an authoritarian manner. They place a high value on party allegiance and frequently act in a strongly political way when using public resources and patronage. Democratic institutions and values take time to form and evolve, but following the coup in 1958, they gradually fell prey to corporate and military interests, which eventually came to dominate the nation’s political discourse and process.

Among the typologies of democracy, Pakistan’s political landscape reflects limited or façade democracy. What is also known as procedural democracy, limited democracy entails a system that incorporates all democratic paraphernalia in itself but the country in spirit is not democratic. Democracy is not cognitively internalized by the system or the actors. Likewise, Pakistan’s democratic system is marked by an established system of institutional procedures, elections, and transfer of power but the structural adjustments are decisively made to keep power in few hands. Furthermore, another typology of democracy that Pakistan’s system reflects is biased democracy. Biased democracy exhibits a system in which there are institutions, elections, and apparent democratic procedures but institutions within the state are biased and do not let democracy thrive for power politics. Biased democracy embodies democratic governance but has serious flaws when it comes to safeguarding individual rights, upholding the rule of law, ensuring a fair and competitive electoral process, and fostering a truly inclusive political environment. Elected institutions and non-elected institutions are two components of statecraft. Ideally, democracy works best when the elected component works with non-elected on the basis of cooperation and coordination or vice versa. On the contrary, in biased democracies like ours, the relationship between the two components is governed by power authority, and control. Thanks to the colonial legacy, when Pakistan was formed the two bureaucracies were the only organized and hierarchal structures like in the times of the colonial era which inevitably led them to form their hegemony over all other state institutes. Along these lines, Hamza Alvi in his book reinstates that the military was an overly developed institute since Pakistan’s inception as compared to other civilian institutes which created a power vacuum so eventually military ceased its power. Throughout the history of Pakistan, it has integrated two systems: Authoritative tradition and Viceregal tradition. The authoritative tradition is explained by the work of Ayesha Jalal. Ayesha Jalal sees the bureaucracy, specifically military dominance as a post-independence phenomenon. The military has been portrayed by her as being extremely predatory in pursuing its institutional and organizational goals. Nevertheless, she also labels civil bureaucracy and government as a rent-seeking institution, with its alliance providing financial and political benefits. Because there was no genuine political process in Pakistan, the military and civil bureaucracy formed an institutional synergy to increase their institutional power and govern the country. On the other hand, the Viceregal tradition embodies an exploitive bureaucratic tradition where those who don’t contest elections are more powerful than those who contest elections. Inheriting and internalizing these viceregal traditions from colonial times Viceregal politics evolved as Pakistan’s descent into repressive authoritarianism solidified, putting democracy in a state of cryostasis. In short, the institutions have encroached on the space of electoral democracy in Pakistan. Consequently, Institutional divergence and their predominance in Pakistan have had the most adverse consequences on democratic norms and have significantly undermined them.

Can democracy in Pakistan be Consolidated?

Though Pakistan’s fledgling democracy can be defined as Praetorian, hybrid, or limited but will it ever be able to consolidate its democracy, or will it ever be able to deepen its democratic institutionalism? As our chequered history bears witness of it, the chances of democracy being consolidated in Pakistan are very fewer. Our fragile political system didn’t take a toll at the expense of one political actor but rather the entire networking of politico actors which include politicians, feudal, military, bureaucrats, and corporate stakeholders, whose personal objectives seem to supersede the national or masses welfare which eventually brought us to the curb. On the contrary, when democracy is consolidated, civil society has the freedom of association and representation, it has the capacity to diffuse state-driven narratives. It challenges the repressive pursuit of state apparatus rather in our case civil society stands at the wounded end of repressive state apparatus. Moreover, democracy is to be internalized, the spirit of law and constitutionalism irrespective of everything cannot be apprehended no matter what. However, in Pakistan from what is apparent constitution is not the sole guarantor, but it is played at the hands of actors who consider themselves above the law. The gravest problem in Pakistani politics is that our political circle plays beyond its defined constitutional scope which inevitably leads to the plundering of public resources and freedom.

In conclusion, rethinking Pakistan as a democracy is a task that necessitates not merely dealing with democracy as an ideal but also as a necessary condition for the stability and progress of the country. Likewise, the only solution to limited democracy is more democracy and internalizing the reforms that can lead to democracy being consolidated. These may involve strengthening democratic institutions and decentralizing power. Similarly, Mohammad Waseem has precisely defined three obstacles that hinder the way to progress, those include The Centralization of power, the Militarization of authority, and the Islamization of Narrative. Nevertheless, for democracy to sustain its spirit, Pakistan will certainly need to overcome and address these pressing challenges.