AUTHOR: Christophe Jaffrelot
Christophe Jaffrelot holds the Avantha Chair in Indian Politics and Sociology at the King’s India Institute. He holds the position of Overseas Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in addition to teaching politics and history of South Asia at Sciences Po in Paris. He is the senior editor of the Hurst book series he started in 1999, Comparative Politics and International Studies, and he serves on the editorial boards of many publications. He frequently speaks about Indian and Pakistani politics in France, the United Kingdom, North America, and India, where he contributes a column to The Indian Express every two weeks.
In this book “In “The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience,” Christophe Jaffrelot offers a thorough analysis of Pakistan’s distinctive path since its creation in 1947. He investigates the basic factors that contribute to the nation’s enduring instability, including ethnic and linguistic diversity, regional conflicts, and the military’s dominant role in politics. Despite these challenges, Pakistan has shown remarkable resilience, navigating political upheavals, economic difficulties, and social tensions. Jaffrelot exploration delves into the historical and sociopolitical roots of Pakistan’s centralized power structure and the military’s prominent role in its politics. The book’s central theme revolves around three main contradictions that shape Pakistan’s narrative: the ideological tension between democracy and authoritarianism, the conflict between centralization and regionalism, and the dichotomy between secular and religious forces. These contradictions are meticulously explored throughout the book, through detailed historical analysis and a keen understanding of contemporary issues, Jaffrelot offers a comprehensive look at the paradoxical nature of Pakistan, revealing how its persistent struggles are counterbalanced by a capacity for adaptation and survival.
The first chapter “Nationalism Without a Nation and Even Without a People?” explore the complexities of Pakistani nationalism, describing it as fragmented and contested. He argues that Pakistan’s nationalism is unusual because it lacks a cohesive national identity and is not based on a unified ethnic or cultural group. Initially driven by elite Urdu-speaking Muslims who imposed a unitary national identity, this centralization disregarded the country’s linguistic and ethnic diversity, leading to significant regional and ethnic tensions. The imposed nationalism struggled to gain widespread acceptance, resulting in recurrent conflicts and instability. This section provides a thorough analysis of how these factors contribute to the paradox of nationalism existing without a fully unified nation or people. The Socio-Ethnic Origins of Indian Muslim Separatism – Jaffrelot discusses the 1857 Revolt, also known as the Indian Mutiny or the First War of Independence, as a watershed moment for the Indian subcontinent. The revolt’s failure led to severe reprisals from the British, particularly against Muslims perceived as key instigators. The suppression of the revolt had catastrophic consequences for the Muslim elite, leading to a profound sense of loss and marginalization.
The collapse of traditional Muslim power structures forced the elite to reconsider their place in the colonial landscape, setting the stage for various responses within the Muslim community, ranging from conservative retrenchment to progressive reformism. In the aftermath of the revolt, some Muslims turned towards traditionalism to preserve their identity and religious values, marking the birth of Muslim fundamentalism in India. Shah Waliullah’s teachings inspired movements like the Deoband movement, which advocated strict adherence to Islamic law and rejected Western influences. In contrast, Syed Ahmad Khan emerged as a reformist who sought to modernize the Muslim community through education and cooperation with the British. He founded the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh, promoting a curriculum that combined Western scientific education with Islamic studies. His reformist vision extended to social and political spheres, emphasizing rationalism, scientific temper, and a progressive interpretation of Islam. The Aligarh Movement, initiated by Syed Ahmad Khan, evolved into a broader political movement advocating for Muslim rights and representation.
The establishment of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 marked a significant milestone, providing a counterbalance to the Indian National Congress. The League focused on securing safeguards for Muslims, such as separate electorates and reserved seats in legislative bodies. This period highlighted the transition from educational and social reform to active political participation, setting the stage for future demands for autonomy and a separate Muslim state. As the Indian nationalist movement gained momentum, Muslim elites perceived a growing threat from the predominantly Hindu leadership of the Congress. This fear led to the emergence of a separatist movement characterized by a deep-seated fear of cultural annihilation and political marginalization. Jaffrelot introduces the concept of a “syndrome” to describe the collective psychological factors driving the separatist impulse. Key figures like Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ali Jinnah articulated the aspirations and anxieties of the Muslim community, emphasizing the need for a distinct political identity and territorial autonomy.
The processes of territorialization and ethnicization were instrumental in transforming Muslim communal identity into a political force. Identifying regions with significant Muslim populations as potential sites for a future Muslim homeland provided a territorial dimension to the demand for a separate state. This territorialization helped galvanize support for the idea of Pakistan, transforming abstract communal identity into a tangible political objective. Jaffrelot critically examines the obsession with achieving political parity between Hindus and Muslims, driven by fears of majoritarianism and a desire to maintain a balance of power. This obsession led to demands for separate electorates and other safeguards, contributing to the deepening of communal divides. The historical grievances, ideological divides, and political strategies that emerged during this era laid the groundwork for the eventual partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. Jaffrelot comprehensive exploration of Pakistan’s political and social landscape emphasizes the intricate balance between its vulnerabilities and its enduring resilience, providing valuable insights into the paradoxical nature of its statehood.
In second chapter “An Elite in Search of State and a Nation (1906-1947)” Christopher claims that the journey towards the establishment of Pakistan in 1947 was complex and marked by various ideological and political hurdles faced by institutions like the Aligarh School and the Muslim League. The Muslim League initially gained prominence through collaborations like the 1916 Lucknow Pact but faced challenges from pan-Islamic sentiments during the Caliphate Movement. This movement, supported by the ulema, clashed with the League’s nationalist objectives. Additionally, regional identities based on ethnicity and language undermined the League’s efforts.
Pan-Islamism, emphasizing loyalty to the caliph, gained momentum in the late 19th century, impacting Indian Muslims’ support for the Ottoman Empire. The ulema, traditional religious scholars, prioritized preserving Islamic traditions despite British colonization. The Caliphate Movement, led by both traditional scholars and activists opposing the Aligarh school’s pro-British stance, expanded Muslim politics in India. Despite initial cooperation with Gandhi’s Congress, conflicts arose, leading to the movement’s abrupt end in the early 1920s.
This period witnessed the emergence of “Muslim Nationalists,” supporting Indian unity while advocating for religious autonomy. These developments posed challenges for the Muslim League, which also grappled with regionalism among Indian Muslims. Ultimately, these complexities shaped the path towards Pakistan’s establishment in 1947.The journey towards the establishment of Pakistan was marked by a complex interplay of nationalistic and pan-Islamic sentiments, regional identities, and evolving political strategies. The Muslim League initially faced challenges in unifying Muslims across different regions, particularly in majority-Muslim provinces like Punjab, Bengal, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), where regional concerns often overshadowed the League’s broader agenda. Despite efforts by leaders like Mohamed Ali Jinnah to secure support, it wasn’t until just before the creation of Pakistan that the League managed to gain significant traction, albeit under misunderstood circumstances.
Jinnah’s political trajectory reflected a shift from a commitment to Indian national unity, as seen in his involvement in the Lucknow Pact of 1916, to a focus on protecting Muslim interests against perceived Hindu dominance. Ideological clashes with the Indian National Congress intensified in the late 1920s and 1930s, particularly regarding demands for Muslim representation and parity. The Nehru Report of 1928 and subsequent Round Table Conferences failed to reconcile differences, prompting Jinnah to briefly retreat from politics before returning in 1935 with a desire for the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as an equal partner in governance.
However, the Congress’s rejection of coalition governments and insistence on “one man, one vote” further strengthened the Muslim League’s position among Muslims, setting the stage for communal divisions leading up to partition. Despite the League’s efforts, gaining support in majority provinces like Punjab, Bengal, and the NWFP proved challenging due to competing political interests and movements, such as the National Union Party in Punjab and the Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, which aimed to bridge religious divides and represent diverse socio-economic groups.
In the NWFP, Pashtun nationalism led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, along with alliances with the Congress, marginalized the League. Despite some success in the United Provinces, the Congress’s dominance, and refusal to ally with the League highlighted the challenges faced by minority Muslims in majority provinces. Overall, these factors contributed to the complex and fragmented political landscape that ultimately culminated in the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s political evolution and the complexities surrounding the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. Initially advocating for Muslim autonomy within a united India, Jinnah shifted towards demanding a separate Muslim state due to Congress’s rejection of his demands and the perceived Hindu dominance. He mobilized Muslim support by portraying Congress as a “Hindu body” and asserting Muslims as a separate nation deserving of political sovereignty.
Events such as the Simla Conference, the 1945-46 elections, and Direct Action Day are discussed, underscoring pivotal moments in the lead-up to partition. The chapter also delves into internal divisions within the League, with regional leaders like Shaheed Hussain Suhrawardy emerging as influential figures challenging Jinnah’s leadership. He highlights the intricate process leading to partition and the ensuing violence, revealing the tensions between unity and fragmentation within the Muslim League’s struggle for Pakistan.
The tension between the federal and unitary systems of governance is discussed in the third chapter “Islamic state or a collection of ethnic groups? From one partition to next”. Fearing Indian intervention and threats after independence, the governor general and constituent assembly denounced provincialism, a step that would continue to influence Pakistan’s relations and policies in the years that followed. This was made clear by the 1946 Muslim Legislators’ Convention, which modified the Lahore resolution in favor of a centralized state. This gave rise to two factions: the first consisted of national leaders who desired the creation of a unified state based on Islam and Urdu. Other focuses on provincial leaders who upheld provincialism to preserve their ethnic and linguistic identity. The result was a centralized state ruled by Punjabis and muhajirs, despite the constituent assembly’s best efforts to resolve these disputes. The unresolved conflict helped Bangladesh become independent in 1971.
He contends that Pakistani officials believed India would not allow their nation to survive, rendering them more susceptible to Indian influence. Because India refuses to share its resources, including military hardware, this vulnerability is particularly acute in the armed forces. This was further aggravated by India’s 1948 cessation of water supplies to West Punjab and 1949 suspension of coal exports. Provincial leaders who disagreed with the policies of the central government were dismissed as a result of Jinnah’s insistence on a unitary state, which was reinforced by an interim constitution that granted the federal government considerable influence over the provinces. As a legacy of the “minority Muslims” who formed Pakistan and sought to establish their hold on power after Partition, Liaquat Ali Khan relied on these policies after Jinnah’s death.
The next thing that Jefferelot examines is the pivotal roles of the Muhajirs and Punjabis in Pakistan’s early state formation. The Muhajirs, or migrants from various parts of India, were instrumental in creating Pakistan and initially dominated its political and economic landscape. Settling mainly in urban centres like Karachi, they leveraged their intellectual and trading backgrounds to control the Muslim League and the nascent state’s administration. He states that their presence transformed cities, particularly Karachi, where they replaced departing Hindus in various professional roles, cementing their influence in the new country.
On the other hand, the Punjabis, who were initially ambivalent about the idea of Pakistan, eventually asserted their dominance due to their demographic strength, agricultural prosperity, and overwhelming representation in the military. British colonial policies had favoured Punjabis, identifying them as a “martial race” and heavily recruiting them into the army, which continued post-Partition. The Punjabis’ economic influence was further bolstered by the British-initiated irrigation projects, which made Punjab a crucial agricultural hub. This relative prosperity laid the groundwork for the “green revolution” in the 1960s, further enhancing their economic dominance.
Jaffrelot details the socio-economic and cultural differences between the predominantly urban, liberal Muhajirs and the rural, conservative Punjabis. These differences led to tensions and a gradual shift in power dynamics, particularly after the assassination of Muhajir leader Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. The rise of Punjabi leaders like Chaudhri Muhammad Ali and Iskander Mirza marked the transition of power from the Muhajirs to the Punjabis. This shift influenced Pakistan’s delayed constitutional development and ongoing struggles with national unity and governance, as the country’s ethnic groups grappled with divergent visions for its political structure.
During the 1950s and early 1960s in Pakistan, there were significant struggles over the distribution of power between the central government and the provinces. The One-Unit Scheme, introduced in the 1956 Constitution, aimed to merge provinces in West Pakistan into one large entity to balance power with East Pakistan. However, this move led to discontent, particularly among Bengalis, who felt marginalized and saw their autonomy diminished. The promises of decentralization outlined in the constitution weren’t fully realized, as power remained concentrated in the hands of the President, limiting the influence of provincial governments. When Ayub Khan seized power in 1958, he further centralized authority, marginalizing voices advocating for regional autonomy. The subsequent 1962 Constitution failed to address these grievances, maintaining the dominance of powerful provinces, and leaving others feeling excluded from the decision-making process. Overall, this period witnessed a trend towards increasing centralization of power, disenfranchising many and exacerbating tensions between different regions within Pakistan.
Mujibur Rahman started his political career in the Muslim League under Suhrawardy, and he later joined the Awami Muslim League and became its main leader after Suhrawardy’s death in 1963. Bangladeshis were underrepresented in civil services and the military; most administrative and military positions were held by West Pakistanis. Economically, East Pakistan earned more revenue from exports, but these profits were financed by the West Pakistani economy, leading to regional conflicts. In 1966, the Awami League proposed a six-point program demanding significant autonomy for East Pakistan, including a true federation with parliamentary democracy, state control over all matters except defense and foreign affairs, a separate currency or fiscal protection, state-controlled taxation, independence of the currency reserve, and trade and regional paramilitary forces. Ayub Khan’s government responded by suppressing these demands, arresting Mujibur Rahman and other party members and accusing Rahman of accepting Indian weapons, leading to the Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1968. Lacking evidence, the trial failed, increasing Rahman’s popularity and further radicalizing Bengalis movement for self-determination. This reaction set the pattern for future regional discontent and demands for autonomy in other Pakistani provinces.
Ayub Khan attempted constitutional reforms towards federalism through the Round Table Conference in February 1969, but failed, partly due to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s boycott. Subsequently, Ayub resigned and was replaced by Yahya Khan, who imposed martial law and promised elections with a federal constitution. Yahya abolished the One-Unit Scheme and set up a de facto federal regime, giving East Pakistan a proportional majority in the assembly. In the December 1970 elections, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won in East Pakistan, while Bhutto’s PPP dominated Sindh and Punjab. Bhutto refused to let the Bengalis rule, arguing that she was more important than the numerical majority, thus echoing earlier strategies of maintaining power by West Pakistani elites. This deepened the political divide and set the stage for further conflict. Rahman proposed sticking to his post to the end, except Bhutto and the central government opposed this. The situation worsened further, culminating in the Pakistani army’s brutality against Bangladeshi intellectuals and civilians in the March 25, 1971, Inquiry. He also participated in supporting the Mukti Bahini guerrillas in Bangladesh. After a short war in December 1971, Pakistan was forced to surrender, and Bangladesh was formed. The conflict caused massive casualties, with an estimated 300,000 to 3 million deaths.
The authoritarianism of the central government and its failure to meet the demands of the Bengalis for self-government harmed the people of Bengal and led to the formation of the idea of unity in the Lahore Resolution. The defeat also weakened Pakistan’s position and revealed the limits of using Islam as a unifying force in a multi-ethnic, multi-ethnic society. The attack continued in other provinces such as the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. In contrast, many Sindhis aligned themselves with the idea of Pakistan, mainly due to the political influence of Bhutto’s PPP, but this also applies to the Muhajirs. The birth of Bangladesh was thus an important moment that not only changed Pakistan’s borders but also challenged its principles, illustrating the contradiction between regional independence and central control.
In fourth chapter “Five Ethnic Groups for One Nation: Between support and Alienation” the author explores diverse and tumultuous interplay of ethnic politics that underscores the complex and fragmented nature of national integration in Pakistan. While Sindhis, like the Punjabis before, rallied around the Pakistan project with the hope of governing through the PPP, other ethnic groups did not follow a linear path. Pashtun nationalism fluctuated, but the rise of Islamism in the 1980s significantly changed the political landscape in the NWFP. The Baloch’s, when not co-opted by the central government, often engaged in conflict due to exploitation reminiscent of East Bengal’s situation in the 1960s. Muhajirs oscillated between violent opposition and collaboration with mainstream parties or military regimes, but their prevailing sense of alienation persisted. Christophe Jaffrelot begins chapter by arguing that post-1971, not only, there was abolition of one unit scheme which resulted in formation of four provinces- Punjab, Sindh, the NWFP and Baluchistan- but democratization process under Z.A. Bhutto PPP appeared to be more tolerant to decentralization than its predecessors.
However, the constitution of 1973 was ideally more favorable to federalism than the practices of ZA. Bhutto’s government. His tacit pact with Punjabis, enabling Pakistani’s two main communities (Sindhis and Punjabis) to dominate the system and his authoritarian methods were at cross-purpose with federalism and parliamentarian spirit of the constitution. In subtopic “Pakistanisation of Sindh” author argues that it was because of Z.A Bhutto rise to Power the sense of victimization and separatism among Sindhis faded, and they rallied around Pakistan project as they started believing they could govern Pakistan through PPP. With the assassination of Bhutto by the Punjabi General Zia Ul Haque, the Sindhi separatism revived. After Benazir Bhutto became PM in 1988, they again rallied around Pakistan project. This defiance and Identification with Pakistan project depending upon ethnicity of Pakistan’s leader, the author argues, is the sign of weakness of the state institutions. Under ‘The Making of Baloch Nationalism’ Christophe Jaffrelot provides a detailed account of the evolution of Baloch nationalism post-1947, starting with the resistance of the Khan of Kalat to join Pakistan, which culminated in a coerced accession agreement in 1948 under military pressure. Despite nominal autonomy, the agreement was largely ignored, prompting Prince Abdul Karim to gather for an autonomous Baloch state inspired by the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Although co-optation by the Pakistani government was common, Karim’s People’s Party continued to advocate for Baloch nationalism, deeply rooted in ethnic identity and historical traditions.
He mentioned that the movement faced divisions due to linguistic and tribal divisions among the Baloch and Brahui groups, with prominent militant tribes being the Marris, Bugti’s, and Mengals. Opposition to Pakistani state policies, including underrepresentation and the One Unit Scheme, fueled the Baloch People’s Liberation Front (BPLF), which gained tribal support especially after Ayub Khan’s violent crackdowns in the late 1950s. Although weakened by tribal divisions, the movement gained momentum with the involvement of a nascent middle class influenced by Maoism and Marxism. The significant 1960s uprising led by Sher Muhammad Marri was crushed, but the more intense and prolonged fourth insurrection from 1973 to 1977 saw a coalition led by the National Awami Party (NAP) pushing for local control, only to be met with severe military repression supported by Iran. This period intensified separatist sentiments, initially focused on regional autonomy. Jaffrelot continues to explore the aspects of Baloch nationalism through the 1980s and beyond, noting how General Zia’s regime employed repression and economic incentives to manage discontent, with some leaders advocating from exile.
Jaffrelot not only noticed 1980`s decline in extremism and collaboration with the central government but also sightsees the Baloch diaspora which supported a revival in the 2000`s prompted by the grievances over natural gas revenues and the development of Gwadar port. Moreover, he explains that the return of democracy in 1988 saw the Baloch leaders compromising with Islamabad amid persistent factionalism and renewed agitation. Christophe Jaffrelot details on Baloch nationalism views how the 2000`s saw a revival of nationalist sentiments, fueled by economic grievances over natural gas revenues and the development of Gwadar port, coupled with General Musharraf’s centralizing policies and electoral manipulations. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) intensified their insurgency, particularly after Akbar Bugti’s death in 2006, which became a rallying point for Baloch resistance. Despite attempts at reconciliation by the PPP government Christophe Jaffrelot discussed that post-2008 proposed reforms, development measures, military’s continued harsh tactics and the rise of groups like the BLA and BRA perpetuated the conflict. The demographic and political shifts, including the growing influence of Pashtuns and Hazaras, further complicated Baloch nationalism.
Furthermore, Jaffrelot pointed out that while moderate leaders like Abdul Malik Baloch have sought to ease tensions, ongoing abuses and the central government’s rigid policies continue to fuel the Baloch struggle. Additionally, he drew an attention towards the international dimension, with links to Baloch separatism in Iran, and that the transfer of Gwadar Port to Chinese control have heightened Baloch fears and contributed to the radicalization of the movement towards violent separatism. Under “The Pashtuns, from Pashtunistan to Pakhtunkhwa” the author has discussed the political journey of Pashtuns from demanding Independent Pakhtunistan to integrating within the country’s mainstream politics. Based on Pashtun nationalism, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his followers opposed to join Pakistan in 1947. When referendum was organized in NWFP, the inhabitants of NWFP had the choice to join either Pakistan or India. The option of an independent Pashtunistan was not given. Even though Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s Red Shirt boycotted the referendum, the referendum was held in NWFP, and the majority voted in the favor of joining Pakistan and thus he accepted their decision to join Pakistan. But Abdul Ghaffar Khan wanted to create a party in alliance with those who opposed the creation of Pakistan, and this was one of the reasons that he was repeatedly sent to jail. His son, Abdul Wali Khan, joined the National Awami Party.
However, in the mid-1960s, some conflicts emerged in the party which became a cause of split in the party. The author further narrates that in the 1970s, Pashtun Nationalism was revived with the support of Afghan President Muhammad Daoud, who advocated for an independent Pashtunistan, and centralizing policies further fueled this nationalism. However, the influx of Afghan refugees and the negative economic impacts of the Soviet-Afghan war shifted the focus from separatism to economic concerns. Wali Khan, continuing to represent Pashtuns, formed the Awami National Party (ANP) in 1986, and in the 1988 elections, ANP formed alliances with parties like PPP, though it faced external threats and internal divisions. The coalition of ANP and PML(N) broke apart due to conflicting views on issues such as the Kalabagh Dam and renaming NWFP “Pakhtunkhwa.”
By that time, NWFP had integrated into mainstream politics, moving away from separatism. In 2009, the ANP government in Peshawar achieved a symbolic victory when the Pakistani parliament amended Article 1 of the constitution, changing NWFP’s name to “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.” Yet, the second Afghan war reinforced socio-political impacts, and terrorist attacks, occurring not only in Pashtun areas but also in parts of Karachi, weakened ANP’s position in the National Assembly, resulting in the party winning only one seat during the 2013 elections. Under “Muhajir Militancy—and Its Limitations” author has discussed the evolving picture of Muhajir militancy in Pakistan – a concept that has roots entrenched in historical, sociopolitical, and ethnic states. After being associated with the Muslim League, the Muhajirs joined Islamic parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamaat-ulama-e-Pakistan (JUP) because of the fading Muslim league. The decadal transformation under Bhutto in his pro-Sindhi policies greatly inspired the emergence of Muhajir identity from a national assault weapon to an ethnic group. This identity reinvention, although devoid of the distinctive ethnic characteristics, emerged because people spoke a common language, shared various cultural references, and, as a result, felt superior to others because of their historical and cultural legacy.
Formation of Muhajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) led by Altaf Hussain in 1980s, their resort to violent methods and political strategies reaffirmed Muhajir identity and its assertiveness against Sindhis and Pashtuns. A critical evaluation shows that the Muhajir Movement has failures and paradoxes. On the positive side, it established a significant ethno-political binding and nationalist narrative, but at the same time promoted the culture of intolerance and violence. The MQM’s ability, and willingness, to switch from political integration to armed activities shows that it is striving to have both a political and a military presence. Despite their calls for the Cuban people’s ethnic and moral superiority, the movement relied on brute force and affiliate with criminals that drove away supporters and solidified the opposition. Moreover, their demographic concerns and hostile attitude toward the Pashtuns and Sindhis indicate a more profound social problem involving assimilation and inclusion within the larger Pakistani society. Their political achievements notwithstanding, the MQM has continued to nurture and maintain ethnic rivalry and insecurity, particularly in Karachi, hampering the unity and economic prosperity of the country. This duality presents a dynamic reality of ethnic identity, political authority, and social accommodation in modern Pakistan.
Under “National Integration through Federalism and Regionalization of Politics?’’ author advances the argument that the even though the issue of national integration in Pakistan is far from settled, particularly because of Baloch nationalism and muhajir violence, yet has not blown out of proportion. Several factors suggest a more nuanced view. Firstly, Punjab’s internal divisions prevent it from exercising absolute hegemony, thereby limiting centrifugal forces. Secondly, the state’s decentralization policies, initiated with the democratization phase in 2008, aim to restore provincial prerogatives. Thirdly, provinces are becoming more multi-ethnic due to migratory flows, though this has not reduced the trend towards the regionalization of politics, as seen in the 2013 election results. The 18th Amendment to the Constitution, passed in 2010, further decentralized power, enhancing provincial autonomy and addressing some long-standing regional grievances. This ongoing process of decentralization and the increasing multi-ethnicity within provinces indicate a potential for reducing ethnic tensions and fostering national integration. However, the persistence of regional political affiliations and ethnolinguistic movements suggests that the path to a fully integrated nation remains challenging. Author argues that it appears that the “minority Muslims,” descendants of a ruling elite, skillfully leveraged Islam to persuade the “majority Muslims” to carve out a state for them to govern.
Pakistan, thus, did not emerge from a prolonged, inclusive maturation process but rather from a brief phase of political unity seized by an elite to fulfill their ambitions. This elite could have united the various ethnic groups under the idea of Pakistan through a federal structure as initially promised, but instead, Jinnah and his successors favored a unitary, centralized state, driven by their political culture and fear of India. This decision, which elevated Urdu and served the interests of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, alienated the entrenched ethnic groups in the provinces. Consequently, Pakistan’s nationalism, born out of opposition to the Hindu “other,” lacked substantive societal cohesion, epitomizing a “nationalism without a nation.” This unresolved national question is intrinsic to the Pakistan syndrome, with the country’s architects and rulers persistently centralizing power, ultimately creating a state that has struggled with its diverse ethnic fabric. In nutshell, this chapter examines the complex and often contentious dynamics of ethnic politics in Pakistan. The chapter underscores how the initial vision of federalism, promised to unite diverse ethnic groups, was overshadowed by a centralizing elite driven by political and cultural fears, notably of India. This centralization marginalized various ethnic groups, leading to persistent regional and ethnic tensions. Despite some decentralization efforts, like the 18th Amendment, and increasing multi-ethnicity within provinces, regional political affiliations continue to challenge national integration. Jaffrelot illustrates that Pakistan’s nationalism, born out of opposition to the Hindu “other,” lacks deep societal cohesion, resulting in a nation still struggling with its diverse and fragmented ethnic landscape.
The fifth chapter “Impossible Democracies or Impossible Democrats?” gives a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan’s complex transition to democratic administration, beginning in the early 2000s and ending in the mid-2010s. It splits down important historical phases, from the early post-independence years hampered by centralizing leaders and colonial legacies to periods characterized by authoritarianism, separatist movements, and attempts at democratization, to more recent difficulties with democratic transitions and election procedures. Through a close examination of the complex interactions between political figures, institutional factors, and socio-ethnic dynamics, this chapter provides a critical assessment of the ongoing challenges and dynamic character of Pakistani democracy.
The first part of the chapter looks at Pakistan’s early years of independence and the challenges it faced in establishing a democratic government. It explores the impact of colonialism, especially the centralizing inclinations of leaders such as Jinnah, and how it affected the formation of political parties. The chapter emphasizes how a number of factors, such as the preference for state formation above democratic ideals and the consolidation of power in the hands of a small number of people, conspired to obstruct the early democratic goals. This part lays the groundwork for understanding the fundamental difficulties that Pakistan faced in building a strong democratic framework in its early years.
Going ahead in time, the chapter delves into the post-Ayub Khan era, emphasizing the democratization processes, the emergence of separatist groups, and the widespread nature of authoritarian inclinations. It clarifies the complexity brought up by interethnic conflict, especially the rise of Bengali nationalism and the eventual establishment of Bangladesh. The chapter covers the difficulty of preserving national unity, the effects of ethnic division on the political scene, and the attempts at democratization made by leaders such as Yahya Khan. This section offers insights into the complex socio-political forces that molded Pakistan during this turbulent time by analyzing the interactions between democratization, separatism, and authoritarianism.
The chapter goes into further detail on the democratization process that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, emphasizing the importance of unelected institutions like the president and the military. It looks at how political parties and politicians dealt with problems including authoritarianism, corruption, and ineffective government. The section emphasizes how difficult it is for citizens to navigate the intricate power structures and how their influence affects the democratic process. This section provides a detailed insight of the challenges Pakistan had in consolidating democracy during this time by looking at the level of lawlessness and the challenges faced by political players in running the nation.
Moving on to the years 2007–2013, the chapter examines the obstacles and constraints faced by Pakistan during its democratic transition. It examines the balance of power between elected and non-elected organizations, especially the military, illuminating the difficulties involved in governing and making decisions. The chapter explores the complexities of the transition process, emphasizing the challenges faced by political players in claiming their rightful places and the effects of conflicting power structures on democratic government. This section provides insights into the changing character of Pakistani democracy at this crucial juncture by analyzing the subtleties of the transition without a definite transfer of authority.
The importance of the 2013 Pakistani elections and the ramifications of the handover of power between opposing political groupings are covered in this chapter. It looks into the electoral process, noting irregularities that are found and the function of organizations such as the Electoral Commission. This section explores the potential and problems posed by the 2013 elections, providing a critical assessment of Pakistan’s chances for political stability and the strengthening of democracy. This section offers important insights into the changing dynamics of Pakistani democracy by examining the election results and their implications for the future course of the nation.
The last section of the chapter looks at the political unrest of 2014, which involved important personalities including Imran Khan, Qadri, Nawaz Sharif, and the military. It highlights the difficulties of governance and decision-making by examining the power struggles and army interventions in Pakistan’s democratic system. This section explores how the crisis has affected Pakistan’s democratic governance and political stability, providing a critical assessment of the opportunities and problems the nation faces. This section offers important insights into the changing dynamics of Pakistani democracy and governance by analyzing the roles played by important players and institutions in the crisis.
The chapter concludes with a thorough examination of the difficulties and complications encountered in creating and upholding democracy in Pakistan throughout its history. The chapter offers insightful information on the dynamic character of Pakistani democracy and the challenges facing its consolidation by examining the interactions of several elements, including the colonial heritage, ethnic conflicts, authoritarian inclinations, and power relations. The chapter provides a critical viewpoint on Pakistan’s chances for democratic governance and political stability through a careful analysis of significant events and developments.
In chapter 6 “variable-geometry military dictatorship”, Christophe Jaffrelot states that the concept of “variable-geometry military dictatorship” in Pakistan refers to the military’s shifting but persistent role in governance since 1947. The Pakistani military’s dominance is rooted in a strategic culture opposing India and a disdain for civilian rule, leading to three significant coups in 1958, 1977, and 1999. These coups ushered in authoritarian regimes that suppressed freedoms, militarized administration, and controlled state resources. Despite their authoritarian nature, these military regimes were unsustainable in the long term, often transitioning towards controlled democratic governance to maintain legitimacy amidst civilian opposition. Ayub Khan’s regime (1958-1969) exemplifies this pattern, combining authoritarian rule with limited democratic processes like the Basic Democracies Order to sustain power. His regime also heavily censored the press and co-opted media through the National Press Trust.
Ayub Khan’s governance emphasized national security over democracy, significantly expanding the military’s size and budget. He pursued land reforms to weaken the traditional landed aristocracy and fostered a new class of capitalist farmers, though with mixed success. Politically, he faced resistance, most notably from Fatima Jinnah in the 1965 presidential election and Z.A. Bhutto after the 1965 war with India, which damaged his credibility and led to growing opposition. Under Ayub Khan, leftist political movements in Pakistan faced bans, arrests, and repression, prompting them to organize into unofficial trade unions and student movements. These groups later agitated against socio-economic issues affecting all, including the army. The author states that this mobilization, along with Mujibur Rehman’s demand for East Bengal’s autonomy, led to Ayub’s resignation in 1969. He handed power to Yahya Khan, who declared martial law and intensified repression.
Ayub Khan’s regime set a precedent for Pakistani military rule, mirrored by Zia-ul-Haq. Zia imposed martial law in response to Bhutto’s election rigging in 1977, initially positioning himself as a neutral arbitrator. He promised elections in 90 days but delayed them indefinitely upon discovering Bhutto’s involvement in a murder and election fraud. To consolidate power, Zia militarized the state, controlled political parties through the amended Political Parties Act of 1962, invoked Islam, repressed political opponents, censored the press, punished academics, and filled the administration with military officers. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), led by Nusrat Bhutto and her daughter, gained significant support but lost momentum after the alleged hijacking of a PIA plane in 1981. Sindhi nationalism’s pursued MRD’s objectives which led Zia to make a few concessions.
General Zia-ul-Haq employed dictatorial policies to retain power amid growing resistance in Pakistan, notably from the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). To counteract dissent, especially in Sindh, he made reformist promises and rigged elections and referendums. Zia’s “civilianization” included appointing Muhammad Khan Junejo as prime minister, who unexpectedly showed independence. Zia maintained control until his death in a 1988 plane crash, paving the way for civilian rule but leaving a strong military influence, evident in General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup. Musharraf followed Zia’s strategy, keeping military spending at around 4% of GDP by removing military pensions from the budget. He institutionalized military power through the National Security Council and placed military personnel in civilian roles. The military’s economic influence grew through property ownership and business ventures, such as the Fauji Foundation. Musharraf established the National Accountability Bureau to target political corruption and introduced the Local Government Ordinance of 2000 to build support. However, his reliance on individuals like Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and the MMA coalition for constitutional changes highlighted ongoing political instability and the limitations of his reforms.
Musharraf was compelled to resign against his will, driven not by politicians but by a robust lawyers’ movement. This movement, which protested the unjust removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary, mobilized widespread support, and convinced the United States and possibly the army that continuing to support Musharraf was untenable. To retain power, Musharraf sought Benazir Bhutto’s aid, agreeing to her condition to relinquish his uniform. He offered the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) to facilitate her return after his re-election. However, Bhutto’s assassination derailed his plans, and an agreement between PPP and PML(N) ultimately forced his resignation.
The author concludes that Pakistan’s political history alternates between military and civilian rule. Military rulers have used democratic tools to consolidate power, while civilian rulers ally with the military to maintain their political influence, avoiding democratic discourse on power interests. This elite partnership, the author argues, prioritizes the interests of a few dominant elites over the welfare of the common masses, perpetuating military dominance in politics.
This chapter “The Judiciary, the Media, and NGOs: In Search of Opposition Forces” aims to give a detailed account of Pakistan and its social-political systems majoring the judiciary, media, and military. The writing starts with the analysis of special actions which were made throughout the government of Nawaz Sharif responding to the problem of enforced disappearances, the activity of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances and the creation of the federal task force. These initiatives are important in the era of Pakistan’s struggle for Accountability in its security agencies, showing a new judicial determination. But the continuation of enforced disappearances, despite such attempts, underlines how the problem is and how difficult it is for the judicial apparatus to effectively counter set military procedures.
This chapter also examines the role of the judiciary – and of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in particular – as the judiciary moved to challenge the military regime. Chaudhry’s attitude is only illustrative of a judiciary that is attempting to stand up to regain its pride and assert its independence. However, the chapter critically analyses how the judiciary has over the years played a counteractive role in the fragile fight for democracy, at one point acting in support of military-bureaucratic regimes. This duality sums up the position of the judiciary in Pakistan to some extent, marking its transition from being a bulwark of dissent to becoming an arm used by authoritarianism.
Additionally, the chapter discusses the Musharraf trials that sparked controversy, as the judiciary again faced the challenge of asserting its authority against political unrest. On one hand, the Anti-Terrorism Court has remained unyielding to Musharraf’s immunity narrative while on the other hand, the special court has meekly accepted Musharraf’s plea to include co-conspirators, the variability of the judiciary portrays internal contradiction and vulnerability to political pressures. This duality has brought about the reality that the judiciary in Pakistan has a very vulnerable independence that continues to be compromised by political influences and interference.
Critic analysis shows that the chapter has the advantage of elaborating on the critical role of the media as an essential force of the opposition, more importantly during the lawyers’ movement. The change of media from a controlled outlet to a significant watchdog body as evidenced by its support for the lawyers’ campaigns also underlines the factor. Nevertheless, it also presents evidence of military and political influence over the media, such as in cases of focused attacks and harassment of journalists. This duality of the media either as an advocate of freedom of speech or as the subject of forcible censorship captures the volatility of media position in Pakistan.
The chapter effectively captures the narrative of the rise of press in Pakistan and its evolution from the inception of Dawn and Nawa-e-Waqt to their woes during different governments. It showcases the ups and downs for the press—the darker days under Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq’s rule and dawn under Musharraf. The continuity of journalists and press fighting for their freedoms even after switching of military and civilian governments is evident and strong.
However, the chapter could have been much more engaging if the author provided detailed socio-economic factors within the media contexts. Enhancing the context, a detailed analysis of how economic liberalization as well as private advertising has influenced media independence and operation would be useful. Moreover, chapter could also explore the effects of digital media and internet restrictions of modern Pakistan, which will encompass beyond limited print and television. While the absence or presence of civil society, investigated here, offers an important evaluation of Pakistan’s democracy. That is why civil society is rarely a dominant factor with NGOs and trade unions struggling to gain the upper hand against the military. This analysis exposes a larger problem that is weak and divided civil society in Pakistan which is unable to put up a united front against the powerful establishment.
Similarly, this chapter also describes that the Election Commission of Pakistan has been making efforts for the improvement of free and fair elections – the electoral rolls are improved and obviously, rejected the dilution candidate. Nonetheless, it also highlights drawbacks that have remained challenges for Uganda, including pre-election violence, electoral fraud, and Supreme Court’s interference with the electoral exercise. This section seeks to establish that there are still many challenges that need to be addressed so as to build a strong and liberate electoral system for democratic consolidation.
In conclusion, this chapter comprises a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Pakistan’s judiciary, media, and civil society. It does a very good job of pointing out the pros and cons of such institutions while discussing their places within the political framework of this nation. Thus, the judiciary and media have taken steps towards independence and promotion of democratic tenets; however, they have been challenged by military and political power structures. The study emphasized the importance of further research to enhance performance and functioning of these institutions to have a more democratic and just society in Pakistan.
The chapter 8, “From Jinnah secularism to Zia Islamization policy”, explains in detail Jinnah’s original vision for Pakistan, suggesting a form of secularism akin to Charles Taylor’s concept. Jinnah’s vision, as articulated in his 1947 speech, emphasized equal citizenship regardless of religion and a clear separation of personal faith from political identity. However, tensions emerged post-independence regarding the role of Islam in the state, sparking debates and compromises in subsequent constitutions. These narrative contrasts Jinnah’s vision with the views of clerics and fundamentalist groups like the Jamaat-e-Ulema and Jamaat-e-Islami, who had differing perspectives on the role of Islam in society and governance.
Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, played a significant role in shaping Pakistan’s early years, particularly in influencing constitutional debates and the country’s religious identity. Initially, Maududi opposed guerrilla operations in Kashmir after the 1948 truce, arguing they went against Islamic principles. This stance led to accusations of sedition and repression against his party, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). However, Maududi eventually supported the creation of Pakistan, aiming to transform it into an Islamic state based on his interpretation of Sharia law. Maududi ideas, along with those of other religious leaders, influenced the Objectives Resolution and the constitutional drafting process, emphasizing Islamic principles in governance. The final 1956 Constitution of Pakistan was a compromise that did not fully satisfy radical Islamic demands, maintaining a balance between Islamic principles and secular governance. Subsequent leaders like Ayub Khan sought to modernize Islamic practices and oppose fundamentalism, ultimately leading to the banning of JI and other political parties.
The chapter also delves into the political influence of religious leaders, particularly the pirs (mystical leaders) and ulema (Quranic scholars), in Pakistan’s history. Ayub Khan’s regime, for instance, aimed to reduce the influence of these leaders, especially the pirs, who held significant sway over rural areas and peasants through the establishment of institution of awkaf. Pirs were often seen as political figures capable of influencing elections and holding office, largely due to their control over land and spiritual authority.
Ayub Khan’s efforts to modernize education and diminish the financial autonomy of religious institutions were aimed at bringing religion under state control. However, his policies did not completely suppress religious leaders, and subsequent leaders like Z.A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq would manipulate Islam for political ends, leading to a complex interplay between religion and politics in Pakistan. Bhutto’s use of Islamic rhetoric and the 1974 constitutional amendment declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims are pivotal moments in Pakistan’s political history. The passages effectively capture the strategic use of Islam for political legitimacy and mass appeal. Bhutto’s approach is portrayed as both pragmatic and populist, reflecting the intricate balance leaders must maintain.
Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies, which began in earnest after he came to power in 1977, had a profound impact on Pakistan’s society and governance. Zia, known for his religious fervor and ties to fundamentalist groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami, aimed to make Pakistan a more Islamic state by implementing Sharia law and promoting conservative Islamic values. One of Zia’s first acts was to change the motto of the army to include “Jihad-fi-sabilillah,” reflecting his emphasis on holy war in the name of God. He also introduced measures to promote piety and religious practice among army personnel, making these factors a formal part of their promotion assessments.
Zia’s policies extended to the legal system, where he introduced amendments to the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) to strengthen blasphemy laws. Blaspheming the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad became punishable by life imprisonment and death, respectively, under these amendments. Education was another key area of focus for Zia’s Islamization agenda. He sought to Islamize the education system by giving diplomas from Quranic school’s equivalence to university degrees. This move aimed to bring Islamic teachings into mainstream education and promote the study of Arabic and Islamic subjects. Zia’s policies also had implications for minorities in Pakistan. The revival of separate electorates for non-Muslims and the tightening of blasphemy laws disproportionately affected minority communities, leading to increased discrimination and persecution.
The writer tries to portray Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s vision as primarily secular overlooks the deep reality of his political stance. Jinnah did advocate for a state neutral in religious matters, but he also used Islamic symbolism and rhetoric to unite Muslims under the banner of the Pakistan movement. The chapter lacks a critical examination of how Jinnah’s vision was interpreted and possibly misconstrued by different political actors’ post-independence, leading to a divergent path from his supposed secular ideals. While the chapter acknowledges the role of Islam in governance, it fails to deeply explore the diversity within Islamic thought and its varied impact on policy and society. There are different Islamic sects (e.g., Sunni, Shia, Deobandi, Barelvi) and they deeply influence Pakistan’s legal and political landscape.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s use of Islamic socialism and his constitutional amendment against Ahmadis are depicted as pragmatic political strategies. However, the analysis does not critically assess the moral and social consequences of these actions. The amendment declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims institutionalized religious discrimination and set a precedent for state-sanctioned exclusion of minorities. The narrative on General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization efforts is detailed but lacks a critical stance on the broader socio-political and human rights implications. Zia’s policies, while aimed at solidifying his regime’s legitimacy, also facilitated the rise of religious extremism and sectarian violence. These policies undermined judicial integrity, restricted personal freedoms, and altered the educational landscape, fostering a generation influenced by radical ideologies.
Moreover, this chapter reflects a transparent and chronological perspective of Pakistan’s transformation from secularism to Islamization. It elaborates complex historical circumstances and ideological debates, potentially leading to a lack of nuance in understanding the issues. It also focuses on political and ideological aspects, neglecting other critical factors like economic conditions, social structures, and regional dynamics. The explanation strength lies in its conceptualization of Pakistan’s political evolution, including the country’s founding, early debates, and global influences. It also elaborates the roles of influential figures like Jinnah, Bhutto, and Zia, which is essential for understanding the political dynamics of the time. However, it could have provided a more in-depth critique of Zia’s regime, including its human rights abuses and violation of fundamental human rights, political repression, and long-term consequences.
To give a more comprehensive understanding, the author could have explored regional and global influences, such as India-Pakistan relations, Middle Eastern politics, and US-Pakistan relations, in more detail. Additionally, encompasses economic and social factors, like poverty, inequality, and education, could have helped in contextualization the appeal of Islamist ideologies and the resilience of secular forces. The chapter could have also benefited from exploring the roles of civil society organizations, student movements, and labor unions, as well as incorporating gender and minority perspectives to provide a more inclusive understanding of Pakistan’s political history and the impact of Islamization on marginalized groups.
The author in chapter 9 “Jihadism, Sectarianism and Talibanism: From Military/Mullah Cooperation to 9/11” explains the relationship between religion, politics, and international events in Pakistan to explain the rise of sectarianism and jihadism from 1969 to 1988 which caused instability in the country as well as the national unity. The author has also explained how different interpretations of Islam have impacted state policies. The author argues that there has been a great influence of Islam with its diverse interpretations ranging from protecting the identity before the partition to its religious aspects in Pakistan’s history. The debate of the character of the state either secular or Islamic caused the Islamization in the 1970s during the era of Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq. This caused the declaration of Islam as a religion of the state as well as the exclusion of certain groups like Ahmadis. The rise of sectarian violence has its roots in Pakistan’s support for jihadism in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Pakistan joined the US to combat terrorism after 9/11 but still has ties with extremist groups causing instability. This sectarianism is often used by political parties for their interests and is causing internal divisions.
The author has used a multidisciplinary methodological approach in this chapter drawing from history, political science, and sociology to explain the emergence of ideas like Jihadism and sectarianism in the region especially in Pakistan. The author has used sources like official records and government documents as well as speeches of political leaders for this purpose. The other sources used include literature from other authors and journal articles. The qualitative methodology has been used to analyze the data. The author has critically evaluated and analyzed the historical bases and evolution of diverse religious interpretations and the relationship between religious politics and identity in Pakistan. The author has also presented an excellent analysis of the influence of religious interpretations on state policies as well as Pakistan’s strategic calculations of aligning with jihadist groups and its impact on domestic extremism.
Throughout history, the state of Pakistan has been involved with Jihadism and Sectarianism which are complex processes having their ideological influences, geopolitical ambitions, and strategic intentions. At the center of this narrative is a series of interrelated factors that have impacted the social and political landscape of Pakistan, further shaping its relations with regional and international actors. The concept of Strategic Depth is one of the main themes to view the approach of Pakistan towards Jihadism. This concept shows Pakistan’s desire to have a like-minded government in Afghanistan which would act as a buffer state against India and others. In the 1980s the ongoing Afghan conflict enabled the Pakistani establishment to establish the Jihadist networks primarily against the Soviets.
However, this strategic alliance faces significant changes. Despite the initial partnership of the Taliban in the 1990s with Pakistan, the differences emerged because of Taliban radicalization, reluctance to take dictation from Pakistan, and other emerging issues such as Pukhtoon Nationalism and the Durand Line. This showed the limitations of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The region’s tensions further worsened due to the Kargil War of 1999 as both nuclear states pursued a confrontational approach.
After 9/11 Pakistan’s dealings with jihadist elements marked a turning point. Because of the global war on terror Pakistan under the influence of America initiated a campaign to dismantle Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Few high-profile arrests were made but the overall approach remained selective. This selective approach was a strategic move by Pakistan to counter its enemies. Pakistan maintained a degree of support for the Taliban, Haqqani’s, and Lashkar-e-Taiba to counter the Indian influence in the region. This dual approach of targeting within Pakistan’s Jihadist landscape contributed to a complex web of alliances and conflicts. Corresponding to the Jihadist narrative is the influence of sectarianism in Pakistan. Zia’s Islamization policy gave rise to radicalization contributing to the Shia and Sunni conflict in Pakistan leading to the domination of Sunni groups and marginalization of Shias. The internal sectarian polarization was further worsened by the external actors Iran and Saudi Arabia supporting their respective groups. Both countries contributed to sectarian escalation with Saudi Arabia supporting Sipah-e-Sahaba and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat and Iran supporting Shia militant groups.
The intertwining of jihadism and sectarianism has had serious effects on the national coherence and stability of Pakistan. State policies and external support led to a cycle of violence and radicalization as a result of militant group proliferation. Significant challenges have been faced to governance and social harmony due to sectarian attacks, targeted killings, and mass violence. The spillover effects of jihadist activities in Indian-Administered Kashmir have been another factor that further complexes Pakistan’s regional dynamics. The link between the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and subsequent incidents like the Mumbai attacks in 2008 strained relations between India and Pakistan, and jihadist groups often served as proxies in this geopolitical rivalry.
The counterterrorism and steps against insurgency have resulted in mixed outcomes. There have been successful operations against militant leaders and groups such as Riaz Basra and Asif Ramji of LJ, but the broader challenge persists. The ongoing challenges are selective crackdowns, rebranding of banned organizations, and infiltration of Extremist ideologies into society. The link and relation between militancy, state actors, and societal factors has been another hurdle to counterterrorism. The distinction between state interests, strategic calculations, and ideological sympathies within specific segments of the establishment provides a favorable environment for extremist narratives to thrive.
The convergence of jihadism and sectarianism impacts Pakistan beyond its borders. It has shaped the Pak-India and Pak-Afghan relations. The Post 9/11 era saw a rectification of alliances and priorities, with Pakistan. Comprehensive Counterterrorism Strategies are required to address socioeconomic grievances, promote tolerance and pluralism, and enhance security. Regional Cooperation between neighboring countries can improve the situation. For this trust building and intelligence sharing are needed. Madrassa education reforms are very crucial for eradicating the roots of extremism and jihadist ideologies. Along with these reforms community engagement is important for a peaceful society and long-term stability. Rule of law and accountability of militant groups and leaders, strengthening law enforcement and judicial process is foundational in countering extremism and promoting security. In nutshell, Pakistan’s history with jihadism and sectarianism is a complex interplay of internal and external factors, geopolitical ambitions, and ideological dynamics. The formation of effective strategies requires understanding this phenomenon and safeguarding national stability.
In chapter 10 ‘Toward Civil War? The State Vs. (Some) Islamists and The Islamists Vs. The Minorities’ Christophe Jaffrelot explores the rise of Islamist movements in Pakistan from the regimes of Zia-Ul-Haq to Pervez Musharraf. These movements have become formidable political and social forces, particularly in the Pashtun regions and Punjab, due to their roles in the Afghan and Kashmir jihads. The jihadist phenomenon, which gained momentum from the anti-Soviet jihad and the Taliban’s influence, profoundly impacted Pakistani society by elevating the status of jihadists and mullahs. Jaffrelot argues that the Islamist groups have embedded themselves deeply into society, not only as religious leaders but also as providers of justice and social services, thereby challenging the traditional social order.
The proliferation of Deobandi Dini Madaris (religious schools) brought significant social changes, which saw remarkable growth in both the Pashtun areas and Punjab. This educational expansion is attributed to the support from the state during the 1980s and 1990s, which aimed to bolster legitimacy and combat Soviet influence. The Madaris played a crucial role in empowering clerics and mullahs who previously had little social or political influence. The religious leaders gained considerable authority and respect, which enabled them to supplant traditional feudal leaders and become influential figures in local communities, especially in South Punjab. This shift disrupted the existing social hierarchies and offered new avenues for social mobility, particularly for those marginalized by the traditional feudal system.
Critically, Jaffrelot discusses the state’s ambivalent relationship with Islamist groups, characterized by a mix of support and suppression. While the state initially fostered these movements to achieve strategic goals, it later faced significant challenges in controlling them. The rooted nature of these groups, combined with their military organization and social influence, made them formidable adversaries. Jaffrelot also examines the negative impact on minorities, who have faced increasing difficulties as Islamist groups have asserted their dominance. The state’s attempts to negotiate and suppress these movements have often been counterproductive, leading to further entrenchment and resistance.
From 2007 to 2010, Pakistan saw a significant escalation in Islamist militancy, marked by events such as the Lal Masjid crisis in 2007. The Red Mosque in Islamabad became a hotspot for Islamist activities, leading to a violent standoff with the government when it tried to reform Quranic schools and dismantle illegal structures. The subsequent military assault resulted in over a hundred deaths, deepening the divide between the government and Islamist groups. This incident spurred the mobilization of Islamist factions like the Terik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in the Pashtun areas, eventually forming the Terik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under Baitullah Mehsud. The TTP unified various militant factions to oppose the Pakistani state, leading to intensified guerrilla warfare and significant violence in regions like the Swat Valley and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
The TTP’s campaign of terror expanded beyond FATA, targeting government and military installations to deter future operations and punish the state. High-profile attacks, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and numerous suicide bombings, highlighted the TTP’s reach and capability. The group’s violent activities, particularly in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), alienated local Pashtun populations who initially supported the Taliban for justice but grew resentful of their oppressive regime. The Pakistani army’s response evolved under General Musharraf and General Kayani, with more decisive actions taken against militants, such as Operation Rah-e-Nijat in 2009. Despite these efforts, the army’s engagement remained cautious, influenced by fears of high casualties and retaliatory attacks, reflecting the ongoing struggle to balance combating militancy with managing internal and external pressures.
The approach of Pakistani Army to combat Islamist militants especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been complex and often controversial. The Army was initially reluctant to engage decisively in FATA due to the potential for high casualties and the threat of retaliatory suicide attacks. This caution persisted regardless of American pressure to act particularly against the Haqqani network. The Pakistani Army increasingly relied on American drone strikes to target militants to mitigate the shortcomings of ground operations. Brigadier Abu Bakr Amin Bajwa acknowledged that drone strikes were effective in scaring the Taliban and isolating them from local supporters. He also expressed a preference for Pakistan to have its own drone technology to address these threats independently.
The Army’s official stance on drones has been ambiguous. While it could not openly support what was seen as a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, there was tacit approval of the strikes. Until 2010, drone operations were coordinated between the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI. ISI used to identify the targets and strikes were carried out by the CIA. The number of drone strikes increased significantly from 2008 and peaked in 2010. The casualties from these strikes also fluctuated. The estimates of total deaths since 2004 range from 2,141 to 3,510 including both militants and civilians. The collateral damage caused by these strikes has been a major point of criticism which raise concerns about the loss of potential interlocutors for negotiations and fostering anti-American sentiments.
The election campaign of 2013 saw drone strikes become a significant Issue. Imran Khan’s party, PTI, oppose them on the grounds of sovereignty violations. In spite of the attempts to initiate peace talks with the Taliban, the continued violence and internal divisions within the Taliban hindered progress. In 2014 the Pakistani Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. This operation aimed to decisively target militant strongholds which led to significant displacement of local populations but claiming substantial successes in reclaiming territory and dismantling militant networks. The operation was justified and supported by various sectors of Pakistani society, including religious authorities who declared it a jihad. Despite these efforts, the resilience of militants who crossed into Afghanistan has continued to pose challenges which suggest that the struggle against Islamist militancy in the region will persist.
The author talks about discrimination against minorities In the newly emerged state, where the question of minority representation played part. Seats were reserved for them during the rule of Ayub Khan, Bhutto and even Zia ul Haq created a separate electorate for them, which was later on abolished by Musharraf. Some efforts to improve their condition were carried out by 2008 governments but despite these, the minorities have continued to face harsh treatment in the state. The Ahmadis were a major target who faced stigmatization and court cases of severe repercussions for them. In addition, Christians have also been subjected to persecution, forced marriages of young girls and blasphemy cases, many of which have been dismissed by court due to lack of evidence. However, the author highlights that we see a trend of extra judicial killings in the name of blasphemy in Pakistan. The case of Asia Bibi and the subsequent murder of Salman Taseer by his own bodyguard represents a picture of radical mindset of citizens and the state. Hindus’ condition in Pakistan has worsened parallel to the condition of Muslims in India. Demolition of mosques and temples from each side, kidnapping of Hindu girls etc. have been a major trend which led to the renewed pattern of migration of Hindus to India during 1990s. The author ends the chapter with the brief account of manipulation of Islam for the achievement of domestic as well as international gains by the leaders and how it contributed to shape its foreign policy.
The author concludes the book by Pointing out the tension between achieving the unity within the newly established state and the strong sense of ethnic identities of these provinces. Just after the partition, the tensions over language and ethnicity arose which led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 and later the sense of separatist feelings among some ethnicities, especially the Baloch. The second aspect that he sheds light on is the lack of democratic culture in Pakistan partly due to the military intervention and partly because of the lack of civilian will and capabilities. The civilian-military coalition has been formed for maintaining the dominant status of elite in Pakistani politics which has led to poverty and the leftist inclination of citizens. The author talks about how politics, religion, and external influences have shaped Pakistan’s identity and policies and explains how debates over Islam’s role in Pakistan, along with economic and social inequalities, have led to internal conflicts. Additionally, he discusses how Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has affected its sovereignty and development, with aid often tied to geopolitical interests. Thus, the writer provides a detailed account of the complex interplay of factors has influenced Pakistan’s trajectory and its position in the international arena.
Umar Miraj
Umar Miraj is a student at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
