The Haqqani network with its lethal fighting force played a decisive role in winning back Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition forces. Political analysts vary on the nature of the Haqqani network. Some portray it as a hardline group within the larger structure of the Taliban. Others label it as a separate entity holding a very loose connection with the mainstream Taliban leadership.
It is actually older than in the Taliban. The 1973 coup of the Daoud Khan was the first instance when the name of Jalaludin Haqqani was heard in Afghanistan politics. During the course of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Haqqani network gained the reputation of fierce fighting force.
Jalaludin joined the Taliban in 1995 after initial hesitation while maintaining its separate identity. The Taliban appointed Jalaludin the ‘Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs’ in its first government. The Haqqani network was reportedly involved in daring assaults at the Indian embassy, CIA outpost in Khost, Kabul intercontinental hotel and many more. In consequence, the U.S State Department designated the Haqqani network a terrorist group. Later in 2015, Siraj Haqqani, Jalaludin’s son, was elevated as a deputy emir of the Taliban under Mullah Mansour.
The new Taliban government announced on 15 August 2021, the Haqqani network’s Siraj and Khalil Haqqani were made in charge of the Interior and Refugees ministry respectively. Siraj was also given the right to nominate governors for several Eastern Afghan provinces.
How the Haqqani Network is Different from the Taliban?
To the outside world, the Haqqani network and the Taliban appear increasingly blended. The Haqqani network is generally heralded as an ” autonomous but integral part” of the Taliban. They are both Pashtun, part of the same ethnic group. However, they are located in different geographical regions of Afghanistan. The majority of Taliban leadership hail from the greater Kandahar region in southern Afghanistan. The Haqqani’s Zadran tribe lies to the more mountainous northeast.
The Haqqanis have always been resistant to central authority, even under the Taliban. Therefore, the leaders of both groups were reportedly involved in a power sharing struggle. The Haqqani Network, with its “track record of supporting overseas jihad,” is even more ideologically and operationally aligned with global jihadist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan (ISKP) than the Taliban is. Unlike Taliban’s local approach, Siraj published a violent manifesto advocating for global jihad outside Afghanistan’s borders. Recently a report concludes that Al Qaeda operates the majority of its military training camps in Haqqani’s controlled areas.
There appear multiple instances when the leadership of the Haqqani network differed from the Taliban. For example, speaking after the appointment, Sirajuddin Haqqani criticized the monopolization of the government by people from religious seminaries and urged the Emirate to involve everyone in the government. He also criticized the Taliban leadership over the issue of women’s education.
What Makes the Haqqani Network so Dangerous?
Within the power structure of the Taliban, the Haqqani network is distinguished due to many factors: first, the Haqqani network is well connected with the Arab governments particularly UAE. The UAE recently invited Saraj Haqqani for a discussion on Afghanistan peace. UAE has had long-standing ties to the Haqqanis that date back to the 1980s. Even Saraj is the son of an Arab lady from the UAE.
Second, the relationship of the Haqqani Network with Pakistan is deeper, older and more serious than the Taliban’s. Mike Mullen once described the Haqqani network as a ‘veritable arm’ of Pakistan intelligence. Recently it was reported that Pakistan backed Haqqanis over bradar in power struggle. Despite Islamabad’s growing concerns with Siraj’s inability to constrain TTP from targeting Pakistan, Siraj remains Pakistan’s principal Afghan asset.
Third, the Haqqani network has become more emboldened and has links to foreign fighters. In addition, it controls more than half of eastern Afghanistan. Under Siraj, the Haqqani Network sent several hundred fighters to the Middle East to support the Islamic State’s efforts in Iraq and Syria. The Haqqani network has also close links with the non-Pashtun Taliban in northern Afghanistan. Theoretically, it is also close to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Khoras. In a stunning display of hubris, Siraj allowed al-Qaida’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to live in a central Kabul safehouse – where a U.S. drone strike killed him.
Fourth, there seems no indication of the Taliban ditching or sidelining the Haqqani Network. They have had a very close relationship for a very long time. Raffaello Pentucci adds that the Haqqani Network enjoys an almost ‘mythic status’ among the Taliban thanks in large part to the exploits of the group’s founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani.
Fifth, the Haqqani network, with its battlefield experience and fearful reputation, constitutes a powerful entity within the Taliban that has the potential to exert a significant influence on the near-future developments in the country. The Haqqani’s are now in charge of the Afghan police, intelligence agencies and other security services. These appointments are indicative of a logic within the Taliban, in which the Haqqani network is a guarantor for security.
both the Taliban and the Haqqani network have far-reaching overlaps in their basic ideological convictions. Moreover, the Haqqanis have been part of both Taliban-led governments. They also never tried to deviate from the main Taliban leadership. Despite the increasing coordination between the two groups, the Haqqani network operates as semi-autonomous under the Taliban with growing assertiveness.
