Understanding Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s Conversion against Pakistan
Pakistan again comes under the tight grip of systematic terrorism perpetrated by groups operating freely from Afghanistan. After the Bannu Cantonment attack, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) claimed that Hafiz Gul Bahadur group (HGB) is the main culprit behind this suicide bombing.
HGB has committed the highest number of suicide attacks since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, primary targeting Pakistan security institutions in districts like North Waziristan, Bannu and Lakki Marwat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Pakistan has consistently pressurized the Afghan Taliban to prevent such groups from launching attacks against Pakistan. Contrary to the demands put forward by Islamabad, the Taliban leadership have brushed aside all these allegations, insisting that Afghan soil is no longer used to harbour or support militant groups engaged in activities against Pakistan.
Pakistani has recently declared the launching of a military operation, named as “Azm-e-Istehkam,” aimed at targeting the Tehrike-e-Taliban Pakistani (TTP), including HGB faction. In retaliation, HGB faction has also announced its own counter-operation, dubbed as “Al-Fatih bin Nasra Rahman”.
HGB operates from North Waziristan, a stronghold of the Wazir tribe. He got his early education in Deobandi Madrasa. The participation in the Afghan civil war made him a hard fighter. He was active as a press secretary of the Jamaat Ulema Islam (JUI) in North Waziristan, an extremist Islamic party of Pakistan. He came to limelight before the 9/11 attack when he frantically opposed the suggestion of deploying United Nations Monitor (UNM) at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
HGB controls the region stretching from Miram Shah to the west of the Afghan border. Infuriated by multiple assassination attempts and increasing pressure from the Bush administration, Musharraf launched military operations in the region in 2004. By 2005, Bahadur resisted the Pakistani military’s efforts to expel foreign militants. However, by mid-2006, Bahadur changed his stance, entering into a peace agreement with the government of Pakistan. Despite the appointment as naib Amir in Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007, he largely distanced himself from TTP due to the disagreements about TTP’s attacks against Pakistani.
However, the peace agreement soon ended in May 2014, just before the launch of a major military Operation Zarb-i-Azb, in North Waziristan. After the Taliban’s coming into power, HGB accelerated attacks on Pakistan security forces and subsequent airstrikes by Pakistan on HGB, further complicated the situation to the point of no compromise.
The Issues Contributing to Discord
HGB going tough against Pakistan is an example of conversation from “Good Taliban gone bad”. But what happened to him?
HGB severely criticized Pakistani establishment for allowing America to conduct drone strikes in North Waziristan. Such attacks made HGB annoyed as they raged his territorial jurisdiction and sometimes killed his loyal fighters. Such feelings may have caused Bahadur to ally with TTP. HGB’s spokesman Ahmadi once said about the peace accord, “This accord is being scrapped because of Pakistan’s failure to stop the American drone attacks in North and South Waziristan…Since the army is attacking us in North and South Waziristan, we will also attack them”.
HGB permanently maintains strategic alliances with the groups like Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, TTP and Afghan Taliban, which have uneasy relationships with Pakistan. The group receives support from the national and transnational militant groups. This support includes additional manpower, safe havens, financial resources, and even advanced weaponry left behind by US forces. This external backing meaningfully boosts Bahadur’s stature as a military commander. So, it is highly improbable for the group to go against the grand designs of these militant organizations.
Politics analysts argue that the treatment meted out to Bahadur’s family and friends during military operations was severe and unjustified, leaving no space for further military collaboration with the Pakistan army. This humiliating treatment embittered Bahadur and fuelled his anti-government stance, thus transforming him from ‘good Taliban’ to ‘bad Taliban’.
Another factor, as perceived by Afghan experts, is the perception within the Afghan Taliban that Pakistan supports the Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP). ISKP is known for leashing out attacks against Taliban in Afghanistan. Consequently, the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban and its affiliated groups leverage the TTP and Hafiz Gul Bahadur to exert pressure on Pakistan, aiming to discourage support for ISKP. In essence, the Taliban leadership are employing tactics similar to what Pakistan did during their resistance against American forces.
Pakistan made an uncalculated move out of Gul Bahadur when it launched military operations in North Waziristan, called Operation Zarb-e-Azb. The operation, launched in 2014, was followed by Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, which began in 2017. Zalmay Azad explains that while Gul Bahadur had expected that the Pakistani armed forces would be lenient with him, the operations saw his house destroyed. Gul Bahadur fled to Afghanistan, but a number of his commanders and relatives were killed. Later on, several airstrikes, ostensibly further fueled Bahadur’s anti-government stance.
Conclusion
To sum up, the informal alliance between TTP and HGB will likely bring disastrous implications for the overall security landscape of Pakistan. Pakistan’s security institutions could not manage the internal political dynamics of the Jihadi organizations, which led to the deadliest combination of militants against Pakistan.
