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Rethinking Pakistan’s Independence-Autonomy, policy, and identity

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Rethinking Pakistan's Independence
Rethinking Pakistan's Independence

” Leadership is the intelligent use of power.”

_Winston Churchill_

Pakistan and its political diaries are a very tightrope walk. Since its inception, post-colonial Pakistan remained either on colonial footprints or colonial-impeded inertia as baggage of history. Post-colonial inherited style of politics, post-colonial model of governance, and all politico-social, and politico-economic rationale largely remained on colonial nostalgia. Since its inception, the post-colonial Pakistan political economy largely remained at a Crossroads of foreign dependence and interdependence. Post-colonial foreign policy largely remained at the Crossroads of internal imbalanced power dynamics among de facto institutions and weak de jure civilians. Post-colonial independence largely remained dependent on the fluidity and liquidity of sovereignty over Various matters. Post-colonial democracy in Pakistan just remained up to the ritual of election and the ritual of parliamentary terms. Post-colonial Islamic state in Pakistan largely remained either on a fundamental aspect of religion or radical rife and the post-colonial civic ethics of Pakistan remained around a tightrope walk over relaxation and independence of minorities and civil liberties for minorities.

Meanwhile, visualizing all existing dynamics rethinking all existing models, and searching for Plato said philosopher king universality and utility in all aspects. Radical and pragmatic rethinking in all aspects is the need of hours. Since its inception political economy of Pakistan largely remained an economy of rent-seeking and just economy of superficial influx of boom and bust. Under the authoritarian cult of political demagogues and under all-time geo-strategic wheeling and dealing the state-craft of Pakistan mostly remains on the principle of rent-seeking based political economy. Dismantling, all previously existing models of rent-seeking and boom and bust they needed a more and more productive approach, more socially integrated approaches, and more communitarian approaches as well. Installment of natural productivity, installment of gendered progresses and installment of value-added aspects can only curb this superficial boom and bust and crisis of unproductivity in the economy. The installment of clear stability from politically motivated will can change the spectra of socially, politically, culturally, and economically isolated indicators with a rethinking of a productive economy as well.

Previously, viewing to post-colonial inherited institutionalized model
De-facto monopoly of Garrison State remained a primary aspect of policy design. Either over aspect of camp diplomacy or buffer in between great power rivalries garrison state construct and aspirations remained most dominant. From policy making to control over policy de-facto monopoly of deep institutions always prevailed by institution for institution. Dismantling the internal de-facto monopoly of institutions and external buffer conception and camp diplomacy rethinking approaches lies among the sovereign design of policy, neutrality of policy, and actualization of narrative and state interests in foreign policy. Previously, post-colonial independence largely remained polarized among partition archives and colonial inherited institutionalized Apparatus. Traditional, south Asian style of politics and politics of peer pressure and hostage factors remained a prominent aspect around Indian-centric factors. Viewing to Indian-centric factor as an existionalist threat the post-independence political strands largely remained motivated by geo-strategic wheeling and dealing and in between conflictual grounds. Rethinking independence approaches must have to lie among geo-economic, win-win-based relations and politics of porous borders to politics of cooperation.

Historically, Pakistan’s democracy just remained around the ritual of elections and just up to rituals of parliamentary procedure. Clear Garrison state authoritarian approach to the always de facto monopoly of Garrison state democracy just remained up to the house of cards and civilian leadership was just a manufactured and artificially groomed thing. Rethinking Pakistan’s democracy as a true Republican franchise truly lies in dismantling vendetta-led politics among civilians around the smooth transfer of power among civilians and a true charter of democracy among civilians. Rethinking approaches also lies among a pragmatic shift in the structure of existing political parties and among alternative narrative regardless of this existing feudal-cum dynasty-cum model of political parties.

Since objective resolution, the Islamic construct and Islamic roots are founded turning into the fundamental aspects and extremely radical aspects over the name and shame of religiosity. Post, Zia’s Islamic angle to ideologic governance as part of the state and religion as a part of the state Islamic angle largely used up over real-politic means. Rethinking Islam in Pakistan lies around the dismantling of religion as a real political tool of cultish, chest-thumping political leadership and the true use of religion as a Republican faith-based franchise and its clear manifestation.

Viewing to dynamics of civil liberties and civic ethics in Pakistan civil society remained the most marginalized subject under the oppression and suppression-based culture of the state and under the patriarchy of the state over culture, politics, economics, and religion. Popular culture sponsored by the state remained only the soul-policed aspect. Culturally much congestion and ethnically conflictual aspect remained the resultant product of state policing. Sometimes, extra moral policing from the state itself acted as a tool of oppression. State-led homogeneous models either over, cultural, political, economic, or religious grounds remained a most disturbing aspect of heterogeneous reality and unity in diversity. Rethinking approaches to the independence of minorities and marginalized communities lie among plurality, autonomy, decentralization, and civil liberties. Additionally, re-thinking of civic ethics and civic liberties lies around Gramscian-made civil society.

While, concluding as an objective aspect the autonomy, policy & identity of Pakistan remained as same as ritual is performed without understanding ritual philosophy. Autonomy either from political, social, cultural, or economic prospectus remained just over fluid construct, Policy making remained highly influenced by politically impeded inertia and identity over the mercy of a homogeneous state-created model. To seek true autonomy all aspects clearly need more and more decentralization and localization of autonomy. Rethinking, in all cadres of policy Making clearly needs political neutrality and actualization of rationale in policy. Rethinking identity clearly needs relaxation in all aspects and finding unity in diversity in installing a heterogeneous model.

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The Politics of Common Sense: State, Society and Culture in Pakistan. Book Review

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Book Review: Politics of Common Sense
Book Review: Politics of Common Sense" by Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

Aasim Sajjad Akhtar is a teacher, left wing politician and columnist based in Pakistan. Asim is an associate professor of political economy at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He served as the president of the Awami Workers Party‘s Punjab executive committee from March 16, 2014 to January 17, 2020. Akhtar did his Bachelor of Arts in Economics with Honors in 1997 from Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA.He got his master’s degree in economics in 1999 from Yale University, and New Haven, CT, USA.Akhtar completed his PhD in political sociology in 2008 from SOAS, University of London at the South Asia Institute, where his thesis was titled The Overdeveloping state. Akhtar is serving as associate professor of political economy at Quaid-i-Azam University’s National Institute of Pakistan Studies, and has previously taught at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. His research focuses on colonial theory and history, state theory, sociology, imperialism, comparative politics, political economy, rise of the middle classes, South Asian politics, identity formation, informal economy and social movements in Pakistan. Akhtar is Honorary Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), a research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS).

The Politics of Common Sense” is a book that critically examines the relationship between power and resistance in modern society. The author argues that dominant ideologies often shape our understanding of the world, and that these ideologies are maintained through the use of power by those in positions of authority.The book emphasizes the importance of challenging these dominant ideologies and promoting alternative forms of common sense that are more conducive to social justice. This can involve questioning the assumptions and values that underpin dominant ideologies and highlighting alternative perspectives and experiences.The author also stresses the importance of resistance as a means of challenging power and promoting social change. Resistance can take many forms, including protests, social movements, and alternative media, and can help to promote a more diverse and inclusive understanding of the world.

First part fills in as an outline of the book’s principal topics, contentions, and exploration questions. The author might talk about the topic’s background briefly, introduce important ideas and terms, and say why it’s important. The book’s structure and the topics covered in each chapter may also be outlined in the introduction.

The author looks at how power works in society and how it is concentrated in certain groups in this chapter. The part might take a gander at how political, monetary, and social influence is practiced by those at the highest point of the social order, like the public authority, the well off first class, and the media. The author might also look into the ways in which this power is preserved and reproduced over time. Chapter 2 of “The Politics of Common Sense” is titled “The Structure of Power ‘From Above'” and it focuses on the analysis of the structure and mechanisms of power in modern societies. The author argues that power is not only exercised through direct coercion, but it is also embedded in the very structures of society, including the economy, politics, and culture. The chapter begins by discussing the concept of hegemony, which refers to the ways in which dominant groups in society maintain their power by promoting their own worldview as natural and commonsensical. This is achieved through the dissemination of ideologies and through the control of cultural and educational institutions. The author then analyzes the ways in which power is structured and exercised in contemporary society, including through the state, the market, and the media. The state is seen as a key site of power, with the ability to shape policies and laws that reinforce the interests of dominant groups. The market is also analyzed as a site of power, with the ability to shape consumer behavior and determine the distribution of resources in society

The processes of wealth creation and accumulation, with an emphasis on capitalism, are the subject of this Chapter. The author may examine how capital is produced through labor exploitation and resource extraction, as well as how this accumulation of wealth contributes to inequality and the destruction of the environment. Alternatives to capitalism and various models of wealth distribution may also be examined in the chapter.

The various manifestations and interpretations of Islam are examined in this Chapter, which examines its place in society. The author might investigate how Islam has been adapted to various historical contexts and used to justify political, social, and cultural practices. Other social forces, like nationalism, globalization, and gender, may be examined in the chapter as well. “The Many Faces of Islam” is the title of Aasim Sajjad Akhtar’s fourth chapter in “The Politics of Common Sense.” In this section, the creator investigates the intricacies and variety of Islamic conviction and practice in Pakistan, and how it has been involved by different entertainers in the political and social fields. The author argues that various groups in Pakistan’s history have used Islam as a tool of power, including the colonial British rulers who relied on Muslim religious leaders to keep order, the Pakistani state after independence, which tried to define a national identity through Islam, and the more recent rise of Islamist political parties and movements, which have tried to assert their vision of Islamic governance. From more traditional Sufi practices to more conservative Wahhabi and Salafi interpretations, Akhtar highlights Pakistan’s diversity of Islamic beliefs and practices. He likewise brings up how different social classes and locales in Pakistan have their own particular translations and practices of Islam, making it a mind boggling and diverse peculiarity.

The concept of nationalism and how it has manifested itself in a particular setting are the subject of this Chapter. The author might look at how nationalism has been used to bring people together around a common identity and to exclude and marginalize particular groups. The chapter might also examine how nationalism interacts with other social forces like race, class, and colonialism. “The Nation that Never Became” is the title of the book’s fifth chapter. In this section, the creator examines the disappointment of Pakistan to frame a strong public personality and the explanations for it. The creator contends that Pakistan’s creation as a different Muslim-greater part state was not in light of a common public character, yet rather based on religion. Consequently, the nation was unable to establish a unified national identity that transcended ethnic, linguistic, and geographic divisions. Akhtar investigates the structural and historical factors that have contributed to Pakistani society’s fragmentation, such as the military’s dominance, the legacy of colonialism, and the significance of religious identity in politics. He likewise looks at the ascent of ethnic and provincial developments, like the Baloch and Sindhi patriot developments, and the difficulties they posture to the possibility of a bound together Pakistani country.
Chapter 6th discusses challenges common misconceptions about class by examining social class and how it functions in society. Class structure and reproduction, as well as its relationship to other social forces like race, gender, and sexual orientation, may be examined by the author. The section may likewise check out at the encounters and battles of the working people and other underestimated gatherings. Chapter 6 of the book is titled “The Subordinate Classes: Beyond Common Sense?” In this chapter, the author focuses on the experiences of the working-class and marginalized communities in Pakistan, and their relationship with the dominant political and economic structures of the country. Akhtar argues that the working-class and marginalized communities in Pakistan have historically been excluded from the political and economic decision-making processes, and have been subjected to various forms of exploitation and oppression.

The epilog gives an end to the book of some sort, perhaps recommending ways of testing or oppose prevailing power structures. The author may discuss specific social movements and political strategies that have been successful in challenging hegemonic power or alternative models of political and social organization. The chapter might also consider the main points and ideas of the book and offer readers a call to action.

Overall, the book’s focus on Pakistan may limit its appeal to readers who are not familiar with the country or its politics. Some readers may find the author’s political stance to be overly critical of the ruling elite and their policies, which could be seen as a bias by some. The book’s theoretical framework may be complex for readers without a background in political sociology or related fields, which could limit its accessibility to some readers. The book may be limited in its applicability to other countries or contexts, as the concept of “common sense” may not translate easily to other cultural or political contexts.

Engage with alternative perspective while the book offers a powerful critique of the dominant common sense in Pakistan, it could be strengthened by engaging with alternative perspectives and arguments. This could help to provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex political and social issues facing the country. While the book focuses primarily on Pakistan, it could be expanded to include a comparative analysis of other countries and contexts. This could help to broaden the book’s appeal and applicability to readers who are interested in political sociology more broadly. Provide more context while the book does offer some historical and cultural context for its arguments, it could benefit from more in-depth analysis of the social and political factors that have contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the dominant common sense in Pakistan.

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Mystery of Enforced Disappearances in Pakistan

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mystery-of-enforced-disappearances-and-missing-persons-in-pakistan
mystery-of-enforced-disappearances-and-missing-persons-in-pakistan

The enigma of missing persons” remains unsolved in 2023, having begun as a trend under Musharraf‘s rule in 2002. Although such methods have been prevalent since the 1980s, injustice accelerated following the 9/11 attacks. According to the United Nations Declaration of 1992, a missing person is one who is abducted or arrested against their will and their families are refused access to their whereabouts. During the “war on terror,” a considerable number of people, including political activists, journalists, human rights’ activists and students, were seized without being tried in any court.
According to a report by the Organization for World Peace, around 8000 persons went missing as a result of the war, with no information on more than 2000 of them available to date. The figure is troubling for the impacted families as well as the state and violates basic human rights principles.

Missing persons’ cases have largely been reported from FATA and Baluchistan, where people appear to be protesting from time to time in the hope of regaining their basic rights. The issue is one of human rights, and it requires political attention and seriousness. Several attempts by the state to resolve the problem have previously failed. The Supreme Court of Pakistan attempted something similar in 2006, but it failed due to Parvez Musharraf’s declaration of emergency. Another attempt was made in 2011 when a commission was formed to investigate the situation, which showed that not a single responsible involved has been discovered to date, highlighting the state’s incapability to tackle the problem. The enforced disappearances have long been criminalized as per the international law but no such law exists in Pakistan till date.

The mainstream parties appear hesitant to address a major issue that affects its population and jeopardizes Pakistan’s credibility. However, these parties are more likely to utilize such slogans in political campaigning and against their political opponents in power. During campaigns, there has been a pattern of raising awareness of “enforced disappearances” and ensuring the support of those impacted. Despite the fact that no genuine progress has been achieved on the matter yet during his movement, the Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) appeared to be on the front line of volunteering for the unheard issue. Once in power, his government appeared eager to prosecute these disappearances through the legal system. The law was signed by the National Assembly but never made it to the Senate, with the claim that it went ‘missing’. This throws insight on higher authorities’ reluctance and incapacity in this area. Among all of these odds, the Chairperson of the “Voice of Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP)” stated that 430 missing Baloch returned to their homes during Khan’s reign, while approximately 600 went missing during his tenure.

The issue has now expanded to encompass those who advocate for the release of those who have been kidnapped forcibly. Hafeez Baloch, a student at Quaid-I-Azam University, went missing in February 2022 with no trace of him. He was imprisoned in March 2022 on terrorist allegations that were ultimately proven to be false, and he was released on July 30, 2022. This is just one example that received attention as a result of the protests of his fellow students and activists. Others include Hidayatullah Lohar (a political activist from Sindh), Muhammad Amin (a political activist from Karachi), and Amin Khattak (a human rights activist from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) who met the same fate. The recent arrest of iman Mazari, a lawyer and a political activist against enforced disappearances, is one glimpse of the matter in discussion. The recent legislations passed in haste have further paved ways for the current practice to aggravate, which will prove to be lethal towards the preservation of basic rights in Pakistan.

The state must not turn a blind eye to the anguish and suffering of these people and their families, who have been denied information about their loved ones for years. While listing the state’s policy preferences, the subject must be given importance and made a priority. The issue should not be regarded as a secondary order since it creates instability inside the state, allowing anti-state forces to dominate and ultimately weakening the state. There is an urgent need for such legislation and its implementation for the return of these persons, who should be tried in courts according to the constitution if any charges are brought against them. Such abductions will never be embraced by national or international human rights  authorities.

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The Forgotten Words of M.A Jinnah | Minorities in Pakistan

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Minorities rights in Pakistan | M.A Jinnah
The Forgotten Words of M.A Jinnah | Minorities in Pakistan

“You are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed- that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”
These words of M.A Jinnah are written on the dusty pages in history of Pakistan, hypothesized while addressing to the Constituent Assembly on 11th August, 1947.These very words emphasized on Quaid’s vision of Pakistan and indelible sacrifices that minorities had made in the way of acquiring separate homeland for the impoverished minorities of the subcontinent. But, this vision of Quaid about pluralist democracy with majority of Muslims eroded away with the passage of unwavering time; forthcoming leaders after the death of Jinnah made policies shortsightedly, which plunged the country into religious discrimination, communal riots hinged on religion, language, color and creed.

Evidently, Pakistan is home to many religious minorities such as Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Kalasha; community in Chitral, and minority sects of Muslims akin Shia, Ahmadis than majority Sunnis. These mistreated minorities have unwavering sacrifices in acquiring independence from British Raj and Hindu’s majority. After independence, when Muslims refugees were coming to newly Republic, the Christian Community came forward for their help. Christian Community of India felt closer to Muslim League than Congress; Christians are the people of the Book so religious affinity always existed among them.

Firstly, let’s recall unprecedented sacrifices made by minorities as Christian Community along with other minorities representatives stood strong headed with their courageous leader Jinnah throughout the arduous journey of independence. On 3 Feb, 1948, Quaid, in response to Parsi Community spasnama, assured that Pakistan is the fulfillment of the dream of a nation which found itself a minority in the subcontinent. Therefore, Pakistan cannot forget the minorities living within its borders. He told Christian Parliamentarians on 20th Nov, 1942, ‘If you help the Muslim League to make Pakistan, we will not forget you after Pakistan comes into existence, the Muslims will never forget your contributions. The Christian minority will be a sacred trust for us and the protection of their lives and properties will be our duties.’

Subsequently, appearing before the Boundary Commission on the behalf of Joint Christian Board Mr. S P Singha, who was the Speaker of the Punjab Assembly, emphasized Christians’ feelings of affinity and solidarity with the Muslims, he said, ‘Our people have been living with Muslims over long time, they trust Muslims, they dress like Muslims… with Muslims they have religious affinity.’
On 11th Oct, 1947 speaking to the Armed Forces Jinnah said that one question which had been going through his head was the treatment of minorities. He said he would repeat it again and again that, ‘we will treat minorities with justice.’

After creation of Pakistan minorities contributed to make the country strong and powerful as Christian have played prominent role in the Armed Forces; the Pakistan Army has a list of 52 officers and soldiers who have laid their lives to protect the honor of the motherland. Recently, the member of Hindu Community has started to join Pakistan Army; Pakistan Army has appointed first-ever Hindu Officer Dr. Kalesh Garvada a Major in the Ministery of Defence.
In the field of Education minorities have done splendid job as they have built institutions which enlightened thousands of students who later on became president, army chiefs and many ministers. These Institutions include FC College Lahore, Murray College Sialkot, Gordon College Rawalpindi and Edwardes College in Peshawar. The Missionary Schools were famous for their high standards of education; many ministers started learning their alphabets in those schools.

Additionally, in the arena of medicine, once there was a time in the turbulent history that Christian Women monopolized the profession of nurses and helped the medical profession to stand on its feet in the newly independent republic.

One name which ultimately comes into mind is Dr. Ruth Pfau; who was German Pakistani nun, who dedicated her life eradicating leprosy in Pakistan. She is describes as Pakistan’s Mother Teresa; it was her struggle that Pakistan was declared leprosy-free country in 1996. She has been awarded with many distinguish awards by Pakistan’s Government and is remembered in golden words.

After all the unprecedented contributions, Muslims in return, gave them discrimination, status of second class citizens, social marginalization, forcibly marriages, vandalism of their belongings, based on personal vendettas, and vicious poverty. This process of discrimination started in 1949, when an attempt was made to declare minorities second class citizens under the banner of Liaqat Ali Khan in Objective Resolution; Suresh Chandar Chattopadhiya opposed this resolution in the parliament. While doing so Muslims were given free hand which left minorities handicapped.

Also, 1953 riots against Ahmadis erupted which left the newly made country on the brink of extremism; 2000 Ahmadis were slaughtered until Martial Law was imposed in Lahore. The words of M.A Jinnah were forgotten long ago, after his demise. Forthcoming leaders left no stone unturned to curb the minorities and their social status. In the era of Z.A Butto and Gen. Zia, Ahmadis were literally declared non-Muslim. In the turbulent history of Pakistan politicians used Islam and Islamic Laws as tools to mainstream their politics, which in result, has left the country in religious extremism, terrorism, misused blasphemy laws and turmoil has eroded the social fabric of the societies. The Asia Bibi case, which lead to the murder of Salman Taseer in 2010, the murder of Sri Lankan Priyantha Kumar in Dec 3, 2021 and recent Jaranwala incident disrepute the country enough on international level.

In summarization, throughout the dusty pages of history in Pakistan, minorities remained disenfranchised in society; deprived of fundamental constitutional rights, irrespective of their unprecedented contributions towards Pakistan. We have forgotten the words of M.A Jinnah, chosen different path for nation instead of pluralist democracy; embarked on the way of politics based on personal scores ignoring nation wholeheartedly. If we continue to do so, will be left behind than fast growing economies and if we continue to undo the rights of our minorities, based on religion as well as personal vendettas, our forthcoming generation will end up solving these issues. As Bhagat Singh said;

“Agar ye khita mazhab ke naam par taqseem hua to nafrat ki iss aag ko bhujate bhujate aanay wali naslon ki kamar toot jaegi.” (If this land is divided in the name of faith, a tidal wave of hate so enormous will erupt that generations will be engulfed by it.) — Bhagat Singh

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Like a dog

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Police Presence Amid Innocent Bystanders - 'Like a Dog' Article on Police Brutality
Like a Dog

Like a dog,” said Kafka’s protagonist at the conclusion of “The Trial”, marking his extra-judicial execution at the hands of the police in a Totalitarian Justice system, and here the one condemned to die was 14-year-old Arsalan Naseem’s father, owing to the mental agony inflicted by the Punjab Police.

Post the 9th May strikes, the police functioning has improved in one particular way, to hunt down Human Rights advocates, political activists, and political leaders, but this time around the blessings of the master have known no bounds, resulting in an executive overreach not just on part of the police but on part of the District Management Groups as well. The Islamabad High Court had on 21st June 2023 ordered the registration of an FIR against the DC Islamabad and his fellow accomplices from the police force on illegally detaining a citizen for recovering money, and a similar matter is being adjudicated where police officials are being investigated for abducting un-involved citizens as a mode of pressurizing the accused to surrender and confess.

Like Kafka’s protagonist, are we to be executed or to suffer at the hands of the due process, where lawlessness prevails due to omissions of the Law enforcement agencies, and people dissenting are sent on a round trip across the country through numerous transit remands initiated through legal fiction (FIRs), which can be written again and again across provinces at the instigation of the State functionaries, or by citizens (who have at times in the past rejected partaking in such initiation). At present the only recourse to this is the courts of Law but as the Chief Justice of Pakistan stated “the Courts have been reduced to a rubber stamp”, which marks “the darkest era in the constitutional history” (remarks of his Lordship Mr. Miangul-Hassan Aurangzaib during the Iman Mazari case).

People vanishing in broad daylight, and houses ransacked during the night followed by justifications as to the legality of action are presented on X (formerly Twitter) or in the courts of public opinion through PEMRA subdued entities. Similarly, the police top brass presented their case within the court of public opinion that Arsalan Naseem’s father died of natural causes, but left out their own repeated abuse of due process and mental inflictions. Those who allow the police force to have an open season motivated by political interest should be mindful of the repercussions of their licensing. Should we let this pass or wait till the graces of the invisible hand have shifted to another institution, or better yet bring in again talks for the pipe dream once referred to as Police Reforms?

Despite the passage of the Police Order 2002, nothing has been much different since 1902 – 1903, when the Indian Police Commission at the time submitted its report which later on came to be known as the Fraser Report (Report commissioned during the Colonial Period in order to compare the Colonial Police structure with the Pre-colonial Police Structure). The report contained a portion about the public grievances and complaints, and much to one’s amazement, a great many acts of policing indolence and investigatory ineptitude, which at the time were branded as a reason for using coercive measures are still prevalent today. Furthermore, it stands to reason why Police Reforms and Police Accountability are not a priority, even though the current policing system is reminiscent of the colonial governance structure, while it reeks of Totalitarianism. This sentiment was differently echoed by a former IG Punjab, Abbas Khan who stated that “public has to deal with criminals in uniform”.

Who can tell the unaccounted and non-viral extent of police brutality, what happens when a person is not able to record and upload videos on social media of police illegalities, their description of events in a complaint binds a person to the mercy of the criminal courts for years to come, what recourse does an ordinary citizen have in the absence of an effective judicature, and a self-appeasing executive, and an unconcerned legislature. Unfortunately, the consequences manifest themselves as a parallel policing system that uses the law only either to establish its existence or to reverse engineer a justification for the actions they take, This and the culmination of institutional defects have manifested into the abomination of a police force lead by the PSP from the Federation.

The common folk and disgruntled segments of society, portray a revolution or an absolute abolition as the only solution, but the way forward is advocacy for Police Reforms, aimed at accountability, and greater checks and balances on the Police functions subject to Judicial oversight, within which the long-forgotten Cornelius Commission Report be taken into account because the totalitarian exercise of police functions is not only symbolic of the colonial oppressions but also provides an active license for political victimization and oppresses the ordinary citizen as witnessed during the era of the 15th Parliament and the successive executive actions witnessed during its tenure. For under the legal regime of Pakistan, a person dying or forced to die by the State action or omission might be termed as the narrative demands but the social contract which hangs by its last thread should be rest-itched, in order for the state to resolve its differences with its actual stakeholder, the public as opposed to systemically gratifying its functionaries.  

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Rethinking Independence: Autonomy, Policy and Identity

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Magazine featuring the title 'Rethinking 76 Years of Independence of Pakistan'
rethinking independence

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The Dark Web: Unveiling the Hidden Side of the Internet

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The Dark Web: The Dark Web: Unveiling the Hidden Side of the Internet
DARK WEB

“The Dark Web is a reflection of the criminal underworld, showcasing the adaptability of crime to technological advancements. Its anonymity fosters a parallel economy, fueling cybercrime’s evolution.” – Dr. Michael McGuire.

Hidden beneath the surface of the internet exists an enigmatic domain referred to as the Dark Web. Distant from the visible layers of the online world we engage with in our everyday lives, the Dark Web unveils a concealed realm characterized by secrecy, encrypted dialogues, and activities that skirt the boundaries of legality. While it frequently gains notoriety for fostering unlawful pursuits, it’s crucial to grasp that the Dark Web forms a multifaceted ecosystem encompassing favorable and unfavorable elements.

The term “Dark Web” alludes to the hidden segment of the internet that eludes discovery via conventional search engines like Google or Bing. Instead, its entry requires specialized tools like Tor (The Onion Router), a software that safeguards online actions by redirecting connections through a sequence of intermediaries. This cloak of anonymity empowers users to obscure their IP addresses and shield their identities, rendering tracking their online endeavors a formidable task.

Several tiers are embedded within the Dark Web, each possessing unique attributes. The outermost level comprises websites beyond the reach of search engine indexing yet reachable by those equipped with the requisite software. These platforms frequently serve as entry points to more profound strata, where concealed and unlawful undertakings often unfold. This deeper stratum accommodates content like illicit marketplaces, forums dedicated to hacking, platforms for whistleblowers, and even ideologies of extremism.

The distinct focus on anonymity that defines the Dark Web stands out as one of its most exceptional features. Users’ online activities are channeled through multiple servers to safeguard their identities, creating a chain of encrypted connections that grants access to the Dark Web. This heightened level of privacy appeals to individuals seeking to shield themselves from government surveillance and authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, this veil of secrecy also serves as a magnet for criminals, affording them the opportunity to partake in unlawful activities without the looming threat of immediate consequences.

The Dark Web has gained notoriety for facilitating the trade of illicit items such as narcotics, firearms, compromised data, and hacking services. This illegal activity is accentuated by an additional layer of anonymity when transactions are conducted through cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Through Dark Web online marketplaces that mirror their conventional counterparts, users can seamlessly exchange prohibited goods. The intricate challenge of locating and capturing wrongdoers within this covert realm has stirred global apprehension among law enforcement agencies.

The existence of the Dark Web ignites fervent debates concerning its ethical implications and broader societal impact. Advocates contend that the platform provides activists, journalists, and whistleblowers from oppressive regimes with a means to communicate and share information free from government intervention. Conversely, critics highlight the alarming surge in cybercrime, the proliferation of illicit goods, and the potential exploitation of vulnerable individuals within this realm.

Striking a harmony between privacy and security in the era of digital technology presents a multifaceted dilemma. Within the Dark Web’s realm, the spectrum ranges from constructive to malevolent applications, rendering complete elimination improbable and potentially detrimental. Instead, specialists underscore the significance of global cooperation among law enforcement entities, intelligence networks, and technological corporations to surveil and counteract cybercriminal activities proficiently. Furthermore, educating users about the potential hazards and repercussions associated with involvement in the Dark Web is pivotal in mitigating its adverse impact.

Governments and enforcement bodies are actively tackling the challenges the Dark Web presents. Dismantling major illicit platforms such as AlphaBay highlights their dedication to counter cybercrime. These initiatives encompass intricate strategies such as infiltrating criminal networks, employing cutting-edge digital forensics, and fostering cooperation with global counterparts. Yet, the perpetually evolving Dark Web guarantees the emergence of fresh obstacles, demanding flexibility and ingenuity from governing bodies.

The Dark Web persists as a mysterious and contentious facet of the internet, presenting a dual nature of anonymity and a fertile ground for cybercrime. Its presence underscores the intricate interplay among technology, ethics, and legal considerations. While acknowledging its capacity to facilitate censorship-resistant communication, the prevalence of illicit pursuits underlines the imperative to collaborative global measures to oversee and govern this concealed terrain. As the digital realm advances, reconciling privacy, security, and transparent communication becomes pivotal in shaping the trajectory of the internet’s evolution.

Technology has a dual role in society. It can either be a tool for progress and empowerment or a means for disruption and harm. The Dark Web epitomizes this duality, showcasing how technological advancements can fuel both innovation and criminal activity.” – Dr. Emily van der Nagel.

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Book Review: “Sovereign Attachment: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan” by Shenila Khoja Molji

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Book Review: Sovereign Attachment: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan
Sovereign Attachment: and Affective Politics in Pakistan

The book Sovereign Attachment: Masculinity, Muslimness, and Affective Politics in Pakistan by Shenila Khoja Molji is based on an outstanding blend of historical studies of the role of religion in the politics of Pakistan and the presence of the Taliban group and their alliance with each other in Pakistan and the role of women in their campaigns. The stance of the Taliban and the State of Pakistan. It discusses all these concepts while keeping in view sovereignty. 

The author is known for her theories of Muslim girlhood, which include several articles that analyze the portrayal of Malala Yousafzai and the politics of international development campaigns. She is a pioneer and one of the earliest scholars to write Ismaili women into modern Ismaili history.

In Introduction: The Public Lives and Sovereignty, Khoja-Molji focuses on militant, partisan, and military cultural literature to investigate how Islamic masculinity is defined. These texts include magazines, music videos, dramas, short films, and media productions from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), political autobiographies by Pervez Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto, and Imran Khan, among other publications by the Taliban (magazines, speeches, leader autobiographies, pamphlets, and other texts).

Khoja-Molji demonstrates how the Taliban create a specific Islamic-masculinist narrative, at times in response to the military’s cultural texts, while acknowledging that they are just one of many non-state actors that contest the legitimacy of the state or military over the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Also, she looks at the content of well-known news channels and three big Urdu and two major English publications. The analysis focuses on significant incidents that caused national discussions on sovereignty, especially the Army Public School (APS) attacks in 2014 (which served as the basis for Khoja-Molji’s book), the detention and subsequent release of Naureen Laghari, a 19-year-old, and the Aafia Siddiqui case.

In the book’s first part of Sovereign Islamo-Masculinities, the author focuses on three main characters of sovereign power: the state head, the soldier, and the mujahid.

In the first chapter, Narrating The Sovereign, Khoja-Molji presents the selection of politicians as an important point of comparison between the military leader Pervez Musharraf and his self-portrayal as the son of the soil and Benazir Bhutto, introduces herself as a female democrat and her use of masculinist tropes and kinship metaphors for her authentic claim as a harbinger of democracy and moderate Islam; and Imran Khan who is the non-politician turned politician, and he introduced himself as the outsider and presented himself as the true saviour of the nation. As each political player sets up a position of legitimate authority, Islam is included in these narratives in various ways meant to adhere to democratic norms.

The second chapter, Identity, Alterity, demonstrates how specific narratives of bravery against the Taliban’s cowardice help the military, particularly its media branch ISPR, construct effective economies of love for the jawan. The jawan appears as a ghazi fighting for an Islamic homeland, a saviour protecting Islam from its misuse and abuse under the Taliban, and a martyr ready to give his life to defend his homeland and its people. Khoja-Molji provides further discussion of Pashtun ethnic stereotypes about the Taliban. These stereotypes originated in British colonial literature before being adopted by these cultural documents.

The third chapter, Competing Sovereigns, focuses on Talib’s cultural materials, some of which were occasionally produced in opposition to the stories the military continued to tell. The failure of Pakistan to establish itself as an Islamic Republic is seen as both a betrayal and a source of optimism, along with Pakistan’s potential to serve as an important hub for the creation of Khilafat.

Jihad is promoted as legal violence in pursuing the Khilafat, and the Taliban is portrayed as a mujahid. In their cultural texts, the Taliban are portrayed as sacred and righteous warriors fearless of death. The Pakistani jawan is nonetheless portrayed as deserving of redemption, with narratives asking the jawan to follow the Islamic pathway. The enemy is characterized as the Pakistani and American soldiers. As they assert the concept of the Khilafat furthering God’s cause, the Taliban challenge state sovereignty by appealing to divine sovereignty, transforming themselves into what Khoja-Molji refers to as a “counter public to the state.”

In the second half of the book Stylizing Political Attachments, the author looks at women’s contributions to the Islamo-masculinist in the form of figurations undergirded by affective and cultural labour claims by the Taliban and the state.

The fourth chapter, Subordinated Femininities, analyzes the purpose of military and militant women in the Taliban and military cultural writing. The Taliban depict these women as the muhajir and the mujahids, those who move to the territories they control and those who support their political ideology. These women help the Taliban by doing caregiving and reproductive duties out of intentional labour to become true Muslims. Even when they are called upon to take up arms to support the Taliban, the women operate the Taliban patriarchy. In the ISPR cultural writings, military women are portrayed as soldiers who support the struggle for the country and nurturers. Most narratives focus on the army woman, who, unlike the mujahids, is independent and supported by the institution of the army while carrying out her husband’s emotional and reproductive duty. Khoja-Molji then examines Beti and Behan, the next two female subjects.

The fifth chapter, Kinship Metaphors, focuses on how these important male honour proxies establish and extend the scope of sovereignty by invoking kinship feelings. These actors provide the affective environment necessary for the sovereign functions of aggression, rescue, rebuke, and forgiveness. These figures for the military range from Mukhtaran Mai, the unruly daughter who receives punishment for criticizing the state, to Naureen Laghari, the daughter who is redeemed in people’s imagination.

For the Taliban, these include Malala Yousafzai and Ayesha Gulalai are those who have strayed from the Muslim path of morality and need to be disciplined, and Aafia Siddiqui, the students of Jamia Hafsa and the victim of the Mahmudiyah rape and killings in Iraq all of who should be avenged. The character of Aafia Siddiqui draws on conflicting narratives as her situation is denounced by both human rights advocates and right-wing political organizations, who call on the Pakistani state to fulfil its masculinist duties as a saviour by protecting her. These public appeals also raise questions about the state’s capacity to safeguard its people, particularly its insecure women, which challenges Islamic masculinity; in the figure of the sad mother, that challenge was also found.

In the sixth chapter, Managing Affect, the author demonstrates that what stands out the most is the analysis that, from grief to depression, various roles are given to the grieving mother. In this chapter, the reader observes Khoja-Molji’s intellectual prowess as she uses sadness as a kind of resistance for the mourning mother, moving from Freudian analysis to queer theory. The masculinist state brings up the image of the grieving mother, who serves several objectives: she is didactic in that she teaches mothers proper effect control for dealing with the loss of a child who may have died in a terrorist attack or on the battlefield; she activates the protective impulses of the masculinist state; and she incites a sense of collective mourning that triggers the nation for retaliation. However, the sad mother can represent resistance to the state narrative.

They adopt the persona of what Khoja-Molji refers to as melancholic mothers who rise in frustration to disarticulate their sons’ killing as a sacrifice for the nation and rearticulate it as the result of state negligence when some mothers of the APS victims demand accountability and challenge the national narrative of martyrdom. They continue to reject the conditions that would have made the child’s death acceptable while asserting sovereignty over his body through the intimacy of their relationship with him.

Every year, on the anniversary of the APS, a catastrophic event, readers in Pakistan experience this as the state’s story and display of remembering falls apart in the face of the mothers’ (i.e., the parents’) continuous demands for justice and accountability of the APS attack culprits. By taking such actions, the depressed mother highlights the affective aspect of sovereignty.

Khoja-Molji explains how the grieving mother is a minor figure for the Taliban who frequently appears in texts where the Talib struggles with his guilt about leaving her behind for the greater cause. While Khoja-Molji’s book and the cultural materials of the Taliban don’t cover the mother as much, there is an opportunity for more examination of this silence and shame, particularly regarding the good or bad Muslim son who leaves his parents. The lack of response reveals how some narratives are appropriated for Islamic masculinist purposes while others are censored. Only in narratives of people who have experienced state violence is the mourning mother trope, and it has now become a battle cry for the mujahidin.

These six major chapters give distinctive and compelling arguments for contested sovereignty in Pakistan through performances of Islamic masculinities about opposing and emotive publics. She differentiates in her thorough intellectual exploration of masculinities about sovereignty and Islam. It is significant to note that the publication of Sovereign Attachments coincides with a new wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan brought on by the Taliban’s resurgence and its various factions, an expansion of the cultural artefacts Khoja-Molji has examined, and an urgent need for further engagement with this existing archive.

To conclude, this book presents a methodology and framework for analysis essential for comprehending conflicting bodies of masculinities and sovereignties and resources for researching various state and non-state actors about affective politics in Pakistan and elsewhere.

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The Rich Resources Mountains of Ex-FATA

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Article on The Rich Resources Mountains of Ex-Fata, KPK
Article on The Rich Resources Mountains of Ex-Fata, KPK

The USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the US-led War on Terror against terrorists in Afghanistan in 2001 were terrible events for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which are now a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. After the 9/11 attack, North Waziristan emerged as the most hazardous region and the epicenter of international terrorism. To investigate the rise of Talibanization in District North Waziristan and its effects on the indigenous way of life and faith.

The war on terror has a history of twenty years where the lives of tribal people were socially, politically, and economically marginalized. The region (Ex-FATA) was politically nonconductor to demand their basic human rights in the systematic violence against the tribal people. Multiple military operations were declared against the terrorist organization, and locals sacrificed themselves to leave their homeland for sustainable peace. The partial displacement of tribal people in the settled districts of Pakistan is a question mark for regional and foreign policy. For example, during the conflict, tribal families were conscious of human development. The access to the internet became a tool to communicate with other communities within and outside of a country.

Ex-FATA is composed of seven districts, and each district is special for its diverse natural resources. For example, the mountains of Bajaur are famous for Granite, Chromite, and manganese; district Mohmand has copper, marble, and quartz; district Khyber contains coal, fuel minerals, and limestone; district Orakzai has laterite, construction minerals, and cement; the Mahamad Khel mountains of district North Waziristan are famous for copper, chromite, and manganese; and district South Waziristan has copper, limestone, and malachite.

The seven tribal districts of KP, the former federal areas, have some of the world’s most concerning development statistics. Maternal mortality is 395 per 100,000 births, more than twice the national average, and infant mortality is 86 per 1,000 live births, significantly higher than in most other countries. Out of a population of five million people, about half a million youngsters are still not in school. The literacy rate is 33 percent, compared to 59 percent for the rest of Pakistan, while female literacy is 12 percent, compared to 47 percent for the rest of Pakistan. Currently, 46 percent of people have access to drinking water, whereas the rest of Pakistan has accomplished it for 91 percent of the population.

The 25th Amendment included Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s seven tribal districts. It allowed tribal regions to get development and public services on par with the rest of the nation. However, the aim of this amendment remains unfulfilled. While the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa administration, a resource-poor province, tries to integrate into the tribal territory, the NFC funding allocations have not materialized. Allowing Fata to remain separate and unequal for decades was a national blunder. If the federation does not come together to pay for the tools necessary to enable the Merged Areas to catch up in development, the country will repeat the mistakes it hoped to avoid with the 25th Amendment.

It is an unparalleled opportunity for Pakistan’s decision-makers to do the right thing for national growth. When East Germany merged with West Germany in 1990, it was impoverished, lagging in growth, and had failing public infrastructure. Prioritizing nation-building above short-term improvements in consumption, Germany committed 0.5 percent of GDP per year to develop the eastern regions and achieving full economic and social integration. Is it possible for Pakistan to make a similar national decision? This is a pressing issue ahead of the 10th NFC. We should not pair a watershed constitutional revision with a financing drought.

If there is a lack of funding and underfinancing for the Merged Areas, institution-building and service delivery initiatives, key components of regional development, would be hampered rather than eliminated. While the merger promised to expedite growth and alter the Merged Areas’ socioeconomic situations, it is vital to repeat the union’s initial goal and translate it via the NFC mechanism. Like the rest of the country, residents in the Merged Areas have a legitimate share of national resources. The Merged regions have less than 2% of the urban population, limited access to basic municipal services, and little revenue-raising capacity, and hence compare unfavorably with Pakistan’s developed regions, where huge cities may produce their own funds. Transfers under the NFC method will be one of the key financial sources for developing the Merged Areas in the medium future.

The Merged Areas are a fresh addition of people and territory, responsibilities and development requirements, ambitions, and national goals allocated to the administration of KP, one of the four provinces. This implies that the area must be considered a distinct entity inside the NFC process for financial resources to be channeled toward development and monitoring projects. This is a one-of-a-kind and difficult circumstance. This national development objective is addressed via the NFC system. Now, not later, is the time to handle Merged area finance under the NFC and finish the 25th Amendment. Pakistan rose to the occasion with the 25th Amendment to the Constitution, and it must now do the same with the NFC.

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Feudalism in Sindh’s Politics: Empowerment or Impediment?

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Feudalism in Sindh Pakistan
Feudalism in Sindh Pakistan

As I set out to explore the enigmatic labyrinth of feudalism in Sindh, Pakistan, I was confronted with a rich tapestry of historical roots and deep-seated beliefs that have shaped the province’s political landscape for centuries. The feudal lords, known as Waderas, have existed in this region since immemorial. This feudal system of Sindh has both critics and supporters. Through the historical and critical analysis of the political history of Sindh, one can explore whether feudalism has been a source of empowerment for the people or an impediment.

Feudalism in Sindh follows deep archaic roots. The feudal lords in Sindh existed from time immemorial, but the era of British Colonialism could be termed aggravating. The feudalism before that era did not create a proper class difference, but this era created a Marxist-base class difference between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In this era, land ownership was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful landlords. Over time, this system entrenched the roots of present-day feudalism in Sindh and created control of the feudal elite over vast agricultural lands, fostering a hierarchical society with a limited concentration of wealth and power.

Proponents of feudalism argue that the system provides a sense of social order and stability. They claim that the feudal lords, or Waderas, act as the patrons of their people by supporting their communities through philanthropic initiatives such as building hospitals, mosques, schools, or charity. Also, they argue that the historical feudal justice system allows quick justice and resolution of conflict, which helps maintain peace and law and order, especially in rural areas where institutional powers might be limited.

However, reality paints a different picture. While some feudal lords engage in philanthropic activities, most do not. They often do these activities selectively to maintain power and stay in the area rather than intending to serve the people. Also, the patronage system can create dependence, perpetuating a cycle of subjugation where the vulnerable are forced to remain loyal to their landlords. Someone dependent on his feudal elite for basic survival needs must prioritize survival over any justice.

On the other hand, the critics of feudalism argue that the feudal elites have produced hindrances in the progress and development of Sindh. The concentration of land owned by feudal elites who prefer traditional farming practices to preserve their interests has stifled agriculture growth and innovation. This has also hindered the farmers from producing water-friendly crops, eventually leading to a major contribution to water scarcity. This results in lower productivity and less modernization of agriculture.

Furthermore, the feudal system perpetuates a lack of political representation, awareness, and access to resources for the marginalized community or the proletariats in Marxist terminology. The norm of dynastic politics in Sindh has roots in feudalism, where the political power of their ancestors inherited people along with their assets. This leads to a pool of leaders that may not be competent or committed enough to serve the people. Consequently, most of Sindh’s population has no voice in decision-making processes.

One of the most egregious aspects of feudalism in Sindh is the persistence of bonded labor. Thousands of landless peasants, known as ‘Hari,’ are trapped in a vicious cycle of debt, which compels them to work on the land of feudal elites without any escape route. They are also deprived of the right to vote because they can only vote according to the will of the feudal elite. Although the government outlaws this exploitation, its enforcement remains weak due to these feudal lords’ deep-rooted influence and voter bank in local politics.

The feudal system has also contributed to ethnic tensions in Sindh. Land Ownership patterns have often favored certain ethnic groups, leading to community disparities. Most feudal lords have control over their ethnic community, which helps them fulfill their political interests. This ethnic divide has also exacerbated conflicts, which diverts focus from addressing broader issues of poverty, education, and infrastructure development.

While some proponents of feudalism argue that it offers stability and social order, it is important to recognize the darker side of the system. It has not only contributed to perpetuating inequality but hindered progress and marginalized the vast majority of the population of Sindh. Empowerment can only be achieved by strictly dismantling this system, making a debt-free society, and equitably redistributing the people’s political representation and resources. To ensure a brighter future for Sindh, it is imperative to spread awareness among people and embrace modern and democratic values while preserving the province’s rich cultural heritage.  Only then can Sindh truly progress towards prosperity and inclusivity for all its inhabitants.

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